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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the effect of state generic substitution 
regulations on the generic prescribing and dispensing processes in the Medicaid 
program and describe the factors that influence dispensing and prescribing 
generic drugs.  
 
The primary research objective for this study is to calculate estimate the rates of 
generic substitution (i.e., “Generic Prescribing Rate”, “Generic Dispensing Rate” and 
“Net Generic Rate”) in the Medicaid program between 1991 and 2008 and to 
determine and understand how state regulations influence the process of 
prescribing and dispensing generic drugs in the state Medicaid programs. The 
research performs at the Substitutable Market level and explains the significant 
differences observed. 
 
The study design is a retrospective, cross-sectional time series study. 
Databases from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service (CMS) and the 
“Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data” will be collected with four observations 
per year by state from 1991 to 2008. This data base was complemented with 
Medi-Span Master Drug Data Base ® (MDDB), Medi-Span Price-Check PC ®, 
National Association of Board of Pharmacy (NABP) publications and Medicaid 
Payment Data Base (MPDB). 
 
The data set for this study was the entire population of drugs reimbursed by 
therapeutic class in 48 states (excluding Arizona & Tennessee) since 1991 to 
2008 in the Medicaid program.  
 
The descriptive analysis was performed nationwide and by state. However Fixed 
effects, two-stage least squares regression was utilized to analyze the 
regression models nationwide by therapeutic class. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Prescription drugs in the outpatient setting are the most frequent form of health care 
provided in the U.S.  For most of the nearly two decade period from 1990 to 2008, 
outpatient prescription drug expenditures in the United States grew substantially 
faster than the economy (as measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)).1 In 
the 1990 outpatient prescription drug expenditures were $40.3 billion which 
accounted for 5.6% of national health expenditures (NHE) and this outpatient drug 
spending was growing at an average annual rate of 12.8%.1 In the year 2000, the 
outpatient drug spending had tripled compared with 1990 to $120.9 billion 
representing 8.8% of NHE and they were growing at an average annual rate of 
11.6%.1 By the year 2008, the outpatient drug spending had tripled compared with 
2000 to $242.6 billion representing 10.1% of NHE and the average annual growth 
rate had slowed to 2.8%.1 From 1990 to 2008, outpatient prescription drug spending 
increased 6-fold, while total national health expenditures grew a little more than 3-
fold. In the same time period, 1990 to 2008, the total U.S. economy (as measured by 
the GDP) had expanded 1.6-fold. Clearly, outpatient prescription drug expenditures 
grew substantially faster than the GDP and the NHE from 1990 to 2008. 
Many factors have influenced the growth in drug spending over time including growth 
in the number of persons covered, growth in the number of prescriptions, more new 
medicine approvals by the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), growth in brand name 
drug prices, drugs going off patent and facing competition from generics with lower 
prices, the substitution of lower cost generics for high-priced brand name drugs, and 
other factors.1  
Medicaid is the federal and state health program for indigent and medically needy 
persons in the U.S. Medicaid covered 22.8 million enrollees in 1990, 34.2 million in 
2000 and 47.2 million in 2008.2 The number of persons covered by Medicaid more 
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than doubled between 1990 and 2008. Medicaid program expenditures for personal 
health care grew from $69.7 billion in 1990, to $186.9 billion in 2000, and then to 
$318.2 billion in 2008.3 In the same time frame (1990 to 2008), Medicaid program 
drug expenditures also grew with spending of $5.1 billion in 1990, $19.8 billion in 
2000, and $19.2 billion in 2008.  
While the Medicaid drug spending appears to have leveled out between 2000 and 
2008, this trend was affected by the implementation of the Medicare Part D program 
in 2006. At that time, the drug coverage for about 6 million to 8 million dual eligible 
(i.e., Medicaid-Medicare) enrollees was shifted from Medicaid to Medicare. These 
dual eligibles represented about 20% of all Medicaid enrollees and they used 
substantially more prescription drugs per capita than the remaining non-dual eligible 
Medicaid enrollees. By 2005, the Medicaid drug spending had grown to an all-time 
high of $36.4 billion, but when the dual eligibles were moved from Medicaid to 
Medicare Part D in 2006 the Medicaid drug spending dropped nearly 50% from $36.4 
billion in 2005 to $19.1 billion in 2006.4  
In summary, the Medicaid and Medicare programs are very important and large 
government-financed health care programs that represent substantial share of the 
national economy in the U.S. As of 2006, both programs cover outpatient 
prescription drugs as part of the health benefit program. The Medicaid program was 
the single largest outpatient drug program in the world from prior to 1990 up until 
2005. When the Medicare Part D program began operation in 2006 by providing 
outpatient prescription drugs for covered elderly and disabled recipients, the 
Medicare Part D program became the largest outpatient drug program.  
Outpatient prescription drug expenditures under Medicaid have grown faster than 
total Medicaid program spending over the past two decades. For example, between 
1997 and 2000 the total Medicaid payments (including prescription drug, nursing 
facility, inpatient hospitals and others) grew by 7.7 % per year while in the same time 
frame Medicaid drug expenditures grew by an average annual rate of 18.1 % and 
accounted for more than one-half of the total Medicaid spending growth for this time 
period.5 Since drug expenditures are a significant share of Medicaid expenditures 
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and they have been one of the fastest growing components of Medicaid, the states—
the level of government that directly operates the Medicaid program—are searching 
for methods to help them control the growth of drug expenditures. 
The Kaiser Family Foundation6,7 conducted a survey of the states to identify 
strategies that states are using to manage the growing Medicaid drug expenditures. 
This Kaiser Family Foundation survey found that all states use some type of program 
to manage drug expenditures, and that two of these cost management programs 
appeared to be the most successful. Perhaps, the most common approach was to 
require or encourage prescribing and dispensing of generic medications when there 
is a generic equivalent available. Another common approach to managing drug 
spending was to affect utilization through “prior authorization” (PA) which is a policy 
of a state Medicaid program that requires a physician or pharmacist to obtain 
approval from the state, or a subcontractor, before prescribing or dispensing a 
certain drug product.  
Setting of a maximum limit on the price of generic drugs has been used as a means 
to achieve cost containment for Medicaid. Abramson, et al.8 studied the effect of this 
approach. They analyzed data the MAC (Maximum Allowable Cost) drug lists and 
the FUL (Federal Upper Limit) drug list for five states to determine the number of 
drugs included and the aggressiveness of the pricing limits. They concluded that 
MAC and FUL programs contribute to state Medicaid pharmacy savings by 
influencing pharmacies to dispense lower-priced generic drugs rather than higher-
priced brand name drugs for off-patent medications.  
Other researchers (i.e., Michael Fisher, Jerry Avorn, Sebastian Schnneweiss, and 
David Solomon) studied Medicaid programs that used prior authorization (PA) 
programs to influence the use of cyclooxygenase-2 inhibitors (COX-2s).9 They 
examined data from 50 states and drug use from 1999 to 2000 for NSAIDs and 
COX2s. They found that prescriptions for COX2s drugs accounted for one-half of all 
NSAID doses covered by Medicaid. In the 22 states that implemented a PA program 
for COX2s, the proportion of NSAID doses dispensed as COX2s was reduced by 
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15% and the corresponding cost per NSAID prescription was reduced by $10.28 per 
prescription.  
This research project examines the outpatient prescription drug expenditures for 
covered Medicaid beneficiaries from 1990 to 2008 and the role of generic 
substitution. The purpose of this study is to determine and understand the effect of 
state generic substitution regulations on the generic prescribing and dispensing 
processes in the Medicaid program and to describe the factors that influence the 
prescribing and dispensing of generic drugs.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE   
The role of generic drug products in the U.S. prescription market has changed 
substantially over the past two or three decades. Numerous studies have been 
conducted to identify the role of generic drugs at specific points in time or across a 
short period of time, i.e., two to four years.  A study using the 1989 National 
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) data found that almost all physicians 
prescribe both brand and generic drugs for their patients. However, this analysis was 
not able explain which physicians were more likely to allow generic substitution even 
though physicians are thought to be the most important agent in the prescription 
decision.10 
A study by Mott & Kreling (1997) examined whether the characteristics of therapeutic 
categories and the payment type had an effect on the generic substitution rate. They 
found that generic substitution occurred significantly more often for drugs used to 
treat acute rather than chronic conditions.11 
Generic drug products were dispensed for 54% of all prescriptions in the Medicaid 
program in 1995 and that percentage declined to 51% by 1998 according to a study 
by the NIHCM Foundation (The National Institute for Health Care Management 
Research and Educational Foundation, 2002). If the generic share of all prescriptions 
was returned to 55% of Medicaid prescriptions, the study estimated that Medicaid 
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would save between $1 billion and $1.5 billion annually. A report by the PRIME 
Institute at the University of Minnesota also found that prescriptions for off-patent 
drugs as a proportion of all prescriptions in the Medicaid program declined between 
1995 and 1998.12 
Another assessment of the potential for generic substitution was conducted using the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS-HC) data from 1997 to 2000.  This study 
found that 56% of all outpatient prescriptions were for drugs that were available in 
both generic (non-innovator multi-source) and brand name (innovator multi-source) 
forms. However, the generic drug product was actually dispensed for only 61% of 
these prescriptions resulting in an overall net generic rate of about 37%. The study 
also estimated that if generic substitution had been used every time in this time 
period (i.e., 1997 to 2000), that there would have been annual savings of about $46 
per person for people under 65 years of age and about $78 for people older than age 
65.13  
The economic impact from under-use of generic drugs was estimated in a study 
published in 2003. In this research, Michael Fisher and Jerry Avorn examined 
Medicaid data from 48 states and the District of Columbia from the year in 2000. 
They concluded that Medicaid prescription drug spending in 2000 could have been 
reduced by as much as $ 229 million if generic substitution had been used to its full 
potential.14  The same researchers calculated the potential savings for both a state 
Medicaid program and a private insurance plan and estimated that 3.6% of the 
annual drug payments could be saved.15  Others have noted that the savings 
opportunities were was expected to grow between the mid-2000s and 2012 due to 
the continued number of drug products going off patent or losing exclusivity status. 
The potential for savings from generic substitution varies across therapeutic 
categories. Express Scripts has estimated the generic savings expected in six 
therapy classes.16 They examined “the annual savings opportunity among 
commercially insured members across the 48 states and six therapy classes.” The 
six therapeutic classes were selected from the top 10 therapeutic classes utilized 
most by insured consumers representing 41% of the market in 2003. Drugs in the 
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gastrointestinal agents class and anti-hyperlipidemic agents class had the greatest 
potential savings from generic substitution and therapeutic substitution. This study 
reports that generic substitution has substantial savings potential and that 
therapeutic substitution has even more significant cost savings potential.  
A study by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) was published in 2006 and 
examined the rate of generic drug dispensing in State Medicaid programs during 
2004.17 This study used the Medicaid Drug Rebate (MDR) data set from fee-for-
service prescription claims in that period. The findings showed that on average: (1) 
41% of prescriptions were written for drugs that have no generic substitutes (single 
source drugs) while 59% were for drugs that have generic substitutes available; (2) 
for the prescriptions drugs with generic substitutes available, the generic was 
dispensed 89% of the time; and (3) 54% of all prescriptions were dispensed with a 
generic drug product (non-innovator multi-source drug). 
In 2008, the changes in Medicaid prescription volume after the implementation of the 
Medicare Part D drug benefit were studied. There was a major shift of prescription 
drug spending from Medicaid to Medicare. The study found that across the 48 state 
Medicaid programs, drug expenditures dropped more than 45% from $38.5 billion in 
2005 to $20.9 billion in 2006. The number of prescriptions dropped 49 percent from 
543 million in 2005 to 278 million in 2006. In 2006, generic drugs were dispensed for 
about 60 percent of prescriptions paid for by the 48 State Medicaid programs. This 
average generic rate is more than four percentage points over the 55.5 percent 
average generic rate for these same states in 2005.18 
In more recent years, dispensing of generic prescriptions has grown to reach more 
than 75% of all outpatient prescriptions that were managed by Express Scripts, Inc. 
in 2013.19 Growth in the percent of prescriptions filled with a generic has been 
especially strong in the last decade (2004 to 2013) due, in large part, to patent and 
exclusivity expirations for many of the top selling branded products. For example, 
Zocor (simvastatin) and Lipitor (atorvastatin calcium) were among the world’s top 
selling drugs when they lost their patents and exclusivity periods in 2006 and 2009, 
respectively.20 
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The terminology and measures to examine the role of generic drug products varies 
from study to study. Some studies use the same term such as generic fill rate, but 
define the measure differently. For example, one study labeled the percentage of all 
prescriptions (i.e., whether single-source, innovator multi-source or non-innovator 
multi-source) that were dispensed as a generic drug product (non-innovator multi-
source drug) as the “generic fill rate”.21 Yet, another study, labeled this same 
measure as the “generic dispensing rate”.22 The definition of measures used in this 
study are presented in a later section, although it is worth noting that in this research 
the measure of the percentage of all prescriptions (single-source, innovator multi-
source and non-innovator multi-source drugs) that were dispensed as a generic drug 
product (non-innovator multi-source drug) will be referred to as the “Net Generic 
Rate” or NGR.  
This research study defines three specific measures for the role of generic drug 
products in prescribing and dispensing prescriptions. In addition, this study examines 
each of the three generic use measures across states and across time (i.e., from 
1991 to 2008).  
 
1.3 DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
This section provides definitions for some of the key terms used in this research 
project. The key terms defined here are related to: (1) the drug product regulatory 
approval process and the patent and exclusivity status of drug products (such as 
Single Source, Innovator Multiple Source and Non-Innovator Multiple Source); (2) 
Generic Substitution including related terms such as Bioequivalents and Therapeutic 
Equivalents; and (3) index measures related to Generic Substitution including the 
Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR), the Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR) and the Net 
Generic Rate (NGR). 
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1.3.1. Drug Product Regulatory and Patent Status 
When Congress first passed the law establishing the Medicaid Drug Rebate 
program23, the legislation provided descriptive terms for grouping prescription drug 
products based upon the regulatory process by which they were approved as well as 
by their patent and exclusivity status. The three broad categories for grouping drug 
products are: (1) single source drugs, (2) innovator multiple source drugs, and (3) 
non-innovator multiple source drugs. While these groups were originally defined in 
the OBRA ’90 statutes in the context of the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, the 
terms have been used more broadly over time and have come to be applied 
generally to prescription drug products in the outpatient market.24 
Single-Source (SS) Drug: A single-source drug is a drug product for which there are 
no other therapeutic equivalents on the market. Single-source drugs are drug 
products that are produced or distributed under an original new drug application 
(NDA) approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA), including drug 
products marketed by producers or distributors holding a cross-license to operate 
under an approved NDA.25 Single source drugs are usually protected by a patent or 
some other form of exclusivity, but they may be, at times, the only drug product on 
the market for other reasons such as a very small market size. Usually a single 
source drug is identified as a brand name drug that has no generic equivalent (or 
therapeutic equivalent) drug products in the market. Thus, these drug products are 
referred to as a ‘Single Source Brand’.  
Innovator Multiple Source (IMS) Drug: An innovator multiple source drug is a drug 
product that was first authorized for marketing under an original NDA approved by 
the FDA, but which is now off-patent or has no exclusivity protection; and, it is a drug 
product for which there are more than one approved products with the same active 
ingredient(s), dosage form, route of administration, and strength on the market. An 
innovator multiple source drug product is still marketed by the original NDA holder or 
by their licensee. As long as there are one or more drug products with the same 
active ingredient(s), dosage form, route of administration, and strength on the market 
which have met the FDA’s criteria for pharmaceutical equivalence, bioequivalence, 
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and therapeutic equivalence, the drug products produced and marketed by the 
original NDA holder, and their licensees, are considered innovator multiple source 
drugs. Generally, these products are referred to as ‘Innovator Multiple Source’ or as 
an ‘Off-Patent Brand’ that has generic equivalents in the market. 
Non-Innovator Multiple Source (NMS) Drug: A non-innovator multiple source drug 
is a drug product that is marketed or sold by a manufacturer or labeler other than the 
original license (NDA) holder and which has the same active ingredient(s), dosage 
form, route of administration, and strength as an innovator multiple source drug on 
the market. Most often a non-innovator multiple source drug is manufactured and/or 
marketed by a firm whose drug product was approved by the FDA using an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). A non-innovator multiple source drug is 
considered to be a ‘generic equivalent’ to the innovator multiple source drug (i.e., the 
reference listed drug) if it has been demonstrated to have met the FDA’s criteria for 
pharmaceutical equivalence, bioequivalence, and therapeutic equivalence, and the 
drug product is listed in the FDA Orange Book. Generally, these NMS drug products 
are referred to as ‘Non-Innovator Multiple Source’ or as an ‘Off-Patent Generic’. 
1.3.2. Generic Substitution and Related Terms 
Easy and routine generic substitution (drug product selection by the pharmacist) is 
the product of the Hatch-Waxman Act structure, FDA regulations, and state drug 
product selection laws in our nation’s states and territories. The availability and use 
of FDA-approved generic drug products that are easily and routinely substitutable for 
existing brand name drug products to which they are AB-rated, assures that effective 
price competition exists in the market for a given prescription drug product, and it 
further assures that patient-users will achieve equivalent efficacy and safety at a 
substantially decreased cost.  
The substitution of generic drug products for a brand name prescription drug is a 
complex process that is influenced by both federal and state statutes and 
regulations. The federal laws primarily have jurisdiction over the regulation of drug 
products including market approval, designation of drug products as either 
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prescription only or over-the-counter status, definition of standards and terminology 
regarding which drugs can be considered as therapeutic equivalents, awarding of 
intellectual property rights such as patents and other forms of exclusivity, and other 
aspects of regulation related to drug product manufacturing, marketing and sales. 
The state laws primarily have jurisdiction over the regulation of the professions such 
as medicine and pharmacy and over the interface of professions with patients (i.e., 
consumers). State statutes and regulations address who can prescribe drug 
products, who can dispense drug products, and the circumstances under which a 
substitution may be made for the drug product originally prescribed. The state’s 
authority in regulating prescription drug use also addresses the role of the consumer 
in requesting or prohibiting generic substitution. 
Federal Statutes and Regulations. The role and function of the FDA Orange Book 
(officially known as “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations”) is important to the process of easy and routine AB-rated generic 
substitution. Generic drugs that have met standards for “therapeutic equivalence” 
based on FDA evaluations are, in all material respects, exact substitutes for their 
brand name counterparts, and are given the designation “AB” by the FDA.  There are 
two components to the definition of “therapeutic equivalence”:  (1) “pharmaceutical 
equivalence” and (2) “bioequivalence.”  “Pharmaceutical equivalence” means that the 
generic drug is the same active ingredient (i.e., drug molecule), the same dosage 
form, and the same strength as the brand name counterpart.  “Bioequivalence” refers 
to “products that display comparable bioavailability when studied under similar 
experimental conditions.” A generic drug product and the reference listed drug 
product (originator drug product) shall be considered bioequivalent when “the rate 
and extent of absorption of the test drug do not show a significant difference from the 
rate and extent of absorption of the reference listed drug when administered at the 
same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions 
either in a single dose or multiple doses.”26 
The FDA assures that brand name versions of a drug product and the AB-rated 
generic versions of the same drug product are “therapeutically equivalent,” which 
means that generics “can be substituted with the full expectation by the patient and 
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physician that they will have the same clinical effect and safety profile as the 
innovator drug.”27  The FDA has stated that a finding of bioequivalence means that 
any differences in therapeutic effect of the brand versus the generic drug that could 
possibly exist “should be no greater than one would expect if one lot of the 
innovator’s product was substituted for another.”28  This means that the generic is 
considered by the FDA to have the same clinical effect and safety as the brand. 
Since there is no difference in clinical effect and safety between the FDA-approved 
brand and the corresponding FDA-approved, AB-rated generic drug products, these 
AB-rated generic equivalents are substitutable for the brand name product by 
pharmacists. 
Federal statutes, regulations and rules regarding generic substitution depend upon 
several key terms that are defined very precisely. Among the key terms and 
definitions related to generic substitution are the following: ‘pharmaceutical 
alternates’, ‘pharmaceutical equivalents’, ‘therapeutic equivalents’, therapeutic 
alternates’, ‘bioavailability’, ‘bioequivalence’, and ‘therapeutic equivalence’. These 
key terms from the federal rules and regulations are defined below, as they are 
presented in the FDA Orange Book. 
Pharmaceutical Alternates. Drug products are considered to be 
pharmaceutical alternatives if they contain the same therapeutic moiety, but 
are different salts, esters, or complexes of that moiety, or are different dosage 
forms or strengths (e.g., tetracycline hydrochloride, 250mg capsules vs. 
tetracycline phosphate complex, 250mg capsules; quinidine sulfate, 200mg 
tablets vs. quinidine sulfate, 200mg capsules). Data are generally not 
available for FDA to make the determination of tablet to capsule 
bioequivalence. Different dosage forms and strengths within a product line by 
a single manufacturer are thus pharmaceutical alternatives, as are extended-
release products when compared with immediate-release or standard-release 
formulations of the same active ingredient.29 
 
Pharmaceutical Equivalents. Drug products are considered to be 
pharmaceutical equivalents if they contain the same active ingredient(s), are 
of the same dosage form, route of administration and are identical in strength 
or concentration (e.g., chlordiazepoxide hydrochloride, 5mg capsules). 
Pharmaceutically equivalent drug products are formulated to contain the 
same amount of active ingredient in the same dosage form and to meet the 
same or compendia or other applicable standards (i.e., strength, quality, 
purity, and identity), but they may differ in characteristics such as shape, 
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scoring configuration, release mechanisms, packaging, excipients (including 
colors, flavors, preservatives), expiration time, and, within certain limits, 
labeling.30 
 
Bioavailability. This term means the rate and extent to which the active 
ingredient or active moiety is absorbed from a drug product and becomes 
available at the site of action. For drug products that are not intended to be 
absorbed into the bloodstream, bioavailability may be assessed by 
measurements intended to reflect the rate and extent to which the active 
ingredient or active moiety becomes available at the site of action.31 
 
Bioequivalent Drug Products. This term describes pharmaceutical 
equivalent or pharmaceutical alternative products that display comparable 
bioavailability when studied under similar experimental conditions. Section 
505 (j)(8)(B) of the Act describes one set of conditions under which a test and 
reference listed drug (see Section 1.4) shall be considered bioequivalent: the 
rate and extent of absorption of the test drug do not show a significant 
difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the reference drug when 
administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under 
similar experimental conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses; or 
the extent of absorption of the test drug does not show a significant difference 
from the extent of absorption of the reference drug when administered at the 
same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental 
conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses and the difference from 
the reference drug in the rate of absorption of the drug is intentional, is 
reflected in its proposed labeling, is not essential to the attainment of effective 
body drug concentrations on chronic use, and is considered medically 
insignificant for the drug. Where these above methods are not applicable 
(e.g., for drug products that are not intended to be absorbed into the 
bloodstream), other in vivo or in vitro test methods to demonstrate 
bioequivalence may be appropriate. 
 
Bioequivalence may sometimes be demonstrated using an in vitro 
bioequivalence standard, especially when such an in vitro test has been 
correlated with human in vivo bioavailability data. In other situations, 
bioequivalence may sometimes be demonstrated through comparative 
clinical trials or pharmacodynamic studies.32 
 
Therapeutic Equivalents: Drug products are considered to be therapeutic 
equivalents only if they are pharmaceutical equivalents and if they can be 
expected to have the same clinical effect and safety profile when 
administered to patients under the conditions specified in the labeling 
(emphasis added). 
 
FDA classifies as therapeutically equivalent those products that meet the 
following general criteria: (1) they are approved as safe and effective; (2) they 
are pharmaceutical equivalents in that they (a) contain identical amounts of 
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the same active drug ingredient in the same dosage form and route of 
administration, and (b) meet compendial or other applicable standards of 
strength, quality, purity, and identity; (3) they are bioequivalent in that: (a) 
they do not present a known or potential bioequivalence problem, and they 
meet an acceptable in vitro standard, or (b) if they do present such a known 
or potential problem, they are shown to meet an appropriate bioequivalence 
standard; (4) they are adequately labeled; (5) they are manufactured in 
compliance with Current Good Manufacturing Practice regulations. The 
concept of therapeutic equivalence, as used to develop the List, applies only 
to drug products containing the same active ingredient(s) and does not 
encompass a comparison of different therapeutic agents used for the same 
condition (e.g., propoxyphene hydrochloride vs. pentazocine hydrochloride 
for the treatment of pain). Any drug product in the List repackaged and/or 
distributed by other than the application holder is considered to be 
therapeutically equivalent to the application holder's drug product even if the 
application holder's drug product is single source or coded as non-equivalent 
(e.g., BN). Also, distributors or repackagers of an application holder's drug 
product are considered to have the same code as the application holder. 
Therapeutic equivalence determinations are not made for unapproved, off-
label indications. 
 
FDA considers drug products to be therapeutically equivalent if they meet the 
criteria outlined above, even though they may differ in certain other 
characteristics such as shape, scoring configuration, release mechanisms, 
packaging, excipients (including colors, flavors, preservatives), expiration 
date/time and minor aspects of labeling (e.g., the presence of specific 
pharmacokinetic information) and storage conditions. When such differences 
are important in the care of a particular patient, it may be appropriate for the 
prescribing physician to require that a particular brand be dispensed as a 
medical necessity. With this limitation, however, FDA believes that products 
classified as therapeutically equivalent can be substituted with the full 
expectation that the substituted product will produce the same clinical effect 
and safety profile as the prescribed product (emphasis added).33 
 
 
Therapeutic Equivalence: The term therapeutic equivalence has a very specific and 
precise meaning derived from the definition of “therapeutic equivalents” as defined in 
the FDA Orange Book and reported above. When two or more drug products are 
said to possess “therapeutic equivalence”, each of the drug products must meet the 
exact definition of “therapeutic equivalents” as defined in the FDA Orange Book. 
When drug products are therapeutic equivalents, one drug product can be 
substituted for another drug product and both drug products can be assumed to 
produce the same clinical effect and safety profile as the prescribed product. Drug 
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products are considered to be “therapeutically equivalent” only if they meet these 
criteria, that is, they contain the same active ingredients, dosage form, route of 
administration, strength, and bioavailability. Drug products that have been 
determined by the FDA to be “therapeutically equivalent” are assigned therapeutic 
equivalence codes starting with the letter ‘A ‘ such as ‘AB’ for oral solid drug products 
or ‘AT’ for topical drug products.34  
State Statutes and Regulations.  
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes or regulations 
permitting, encouraging, or, under certain circumstances, requiring pharmacists to 
substitute AB-rated generics for brand name drug equivalents.  The general purpose 
of these statutes is to save people money, given that AB-rated generics are almost 
always expected to be much less expensive than brand name versions of the same 
drug product. State regulations regarding generic substitution often reference, or 
even quote directly from, the federal statutes, regulations and rules including the 
terms defined such as ‘pharmaceutical alternates’, ‘pharmaceutical equivalents’, 
‘therapeutic equivalents’, therapeutic alternates’, ‘bioavailability’, ‘bioequivalence’, 
and ‘therapeutic equivalence’. 
Although there is a general consistency in generic substitution laws across states, 
there are some important differences in how and when state laws allow generic 
substitution. Some states even permit what is referred to as pharmacists’ discretion 
when implementing generic substitution.35 One professional reference source, known 
as the Pharmacist’s Letter, identifies 20 states as having “discretion” to choose the 
drug product to be substituted. However, this pharmacist’s discretion is not 
unfettered discretion. Most states have statutes and/or regulations which specify 
criteria that must, or should, be considered in exercising this pharmacist’s discretion 
when substituting generic equivalent drug products. 
Five of these states identified as having pharmacist’s discretion (i.e., Iowa, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio and Vermont) specify that in exercising professional 
judgment, pharmacists must insure that the product substituted has the same 
bioavailability or dissolution as the drug product prescribed. The language in Iowa for 
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example specifies that “[t]he pharmacist may exercise professional judgment in the 
economic interest of the patient by selecting a drug product with the same generic 
name and demonstrated bioavailability as the one prescribed for dispensing and sale 
to the patient.”  While the pharmacist has discretion, that discretion must be based 
on demonstrated (emphasis added) bioavailability or dissolution. Demonstration of 
bioavailability would require the pharmacist to perform tests or rely upon another 
validated source for this information (such as the FDA Orange Book). Performance 
of bioavailability or dissolution tests is an expensive and time-consuming process 
which is not practical for most pharmacies to perform on their own. Consequently, 
the only practical way for a pharmacist to have assurance that equivalent 
bioavailability or dissolution exists for an alternative drug product is to refer to, and 
rely upon, the list of AB-rated drug products in the FDA Orange Book. In other words, 
to meet the threshold criteria specified in state statutes and regulations in these five 
states, for all practical purposes, the pharmacist has to rely upon the AB-ratings 
published in the FDA Orange Book. For example, pharmacists in these five states 
(i.e., Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio and Vermont) cannot (emphasis added) 
unilaterally substitute a generic delayed-release capsule for a standard release tablet 
product of the same molecule. 
In yet another state (i.e., Oregon) listed among the 20 states with pharmacist’s 
discretion, the statutes and regulations specify that for drug products to be 
substituted the drug products must be “therapeutically equivalent” which in Oregon is 
defined to mean “drugs that are approved by the United States Food and Drug 
Administration for interstate distribution and the Food and Drug Administration has 
determined that the drugs will provide essentially the same efficacy and toxicity when 
administered to an individual in the same dosage regimen.”  Although the FDA 
Orange Book is not named explicitly, for all practical purposes, a pharmacist would 
have to rely upon the AB-ratings published in the FDA Orange Book to meet this 
criterion for generic substitution. Another state (i.e., Washington), that was listed 
among pharmacist’s discretion states, has a similar requirement that drug products 
be “therapeutically equivalent” and the Washington statutes and regulations 
specifically indicate that the FDA Orange Book is a “board approved reference for a 
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positive formulary of therapeutically equivalent products”.  Pharmacists in these 
states (i.e., Oregon and Washington) cannot (emphasis added) unilaterally substitute 
a generic delayed-release capsule for a standard release tablet version of the same 
molecule. 
In yet another state (i.e., Missouri) that was listed among states with pharmacist’s 
discretion, the statutes and regulations specify “A pharmacist shall not substitute 
drug products that are rated as therapeutically inequivalent to other pharmaceutically 
equivalent products as listed in the latest edition or cumulative supplement of the 
“Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations” [also known as, 
the FDA Orange Book] published by the United States government, Department of 
Health and Human Services.”  In other words, through use of a negative formulary, 
Missouri references the FDA Orange Book in a manner that would prohibit 
substitution of drug products that are not AB-rated ‘therapeutic equivalents’. By 
definition, AB-rated therapeutic equivalents must have, inter alia, the same strength 
and dosage form. Pharmacists in Missouri cannot (emphasis added) unilaterally 
substitute a generic delayed-release capsule for a tablet version of the same 
molecule. 
For legal or practical reasons, as described above, 19 of the 20 states listed by the 
Pharmacist’s Letter would not permit routine unilateral substitution of a generic 
delayed-release capsule for a tablet version of the same molecule. 
The FDA Orange Book listing of “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations” serves as an appropriate basis for a pharmacist to use for 
determination of which generic drug products may be considered as equivalent for 
purposes of substitution. In some states, the use of the FDA Orange Book is 
mandated as the basis for determining which drug products can be substituted. In 
most other states pharmacists are allowed discretion over which drug products can 
be substituted, based on specified criteria. In those states where the FDA Orange 
Book is not directly mandated, the FDA Orange Book is the most practical way to 
meet the criteria specified for allowing pharmacist discretion in selection of drug 
products for generic substitution. 
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As described elsewhere in this report, pharmacist discretion for generic substitution 
in many states is limited by a requirement that the originally prescribed drug product 
and the substituted generic drug product have the same active ingredient (i.e., drug 
molecule), the same dosage form, and the same strength. In other states, as 
described elsewhere in this report, pharmacist discretion for generic substitution is to 
be based on “demonstrated” or “documented” evidence of bioavailability or clinical 
safety and efficacy. Again, the FDA Orange Book is the most practical way to meet 
the criteria specified by state statutes and regulations for allowing pharmacist 
discretion in selection of drug products for generic substitution. 
“Therapeutic equivalence”, as defined and evaluated by the FDA (described 
elsewhere in this report and in more detail in the FDA Orange Book) is fundamentally 
different from the concept of “therapeutic interchange”. “Therapeutic interchange” is 
defined by the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy as “the practice of replacing, 
with the prescribing physician’s approval, a prescription medication originally 
prescribed for a patient with a chemically different medication.”  In other words, 
“therapeutic interchange” requires contacting the physician for approval and involves 
using a drug product that has a different drug molecule, a different dosage form, a 
different strength, or other differences from the drug product originally prescribed. 
Substitution of AB-rated, equivalent generic drug products based on “therapeutic 
equivalence” and switching of different drug products based on “therapeutic 
interchange” are fundamentally different processes.   
FDA publishes the Orange Book and monthly update supplements to meet certain 
obligations specified by the Hatch-Waxman Act and subsequent amendments.  The 
Orange Book provides pharmacists and state boards of pharmacy with a reference 
list of (brand) drug products and the generic drugs products that FDA has 
determined to be “therapeutically equivalent”, and thus “AB-rated.”  According to 
state pharmacy practice acts, these AB-rated equivalents are, therefore, easily and 
routinely substitutable for their corresponding brand name counterpart drug products. 
Pharmacists typically dispense less-expensive, AB-related generic drugs in place of 
their brand name counterparts whenever possible, not only because of state statutes 
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and regulations, but also because such easy and routine pharmacy substitution 
benefits their patients (because AB-rated generics are less expensive than brand 
name counterpart) and sometimes benefits the pharmacy (for a similar reason).  
Easy and routine pharmacy substitution of AB-rated generic drugs is essential to 
effective generic economic competition.   If the state-regulated, easy and routine 
substitution of generics for brand name drugs by pharmacists is impaired – for 
instance, if a generic version of the brand name drug is not AB-rated to the brand 
name drug because the brand has been reformulated so that it is not 
pharmaceutically equivalent due to a dosage form or labeled strength change – the 
economic benefits of generic competition will not be realized by purchasers or 
patients, and the goals of Congress, the FDA, and state boards of pharmacy in 
connection with the Hatch-Waxman Act framework will be frustrated.   This is, in part, 
because under the Hatch-Waxman Act framework, demand for generic drugs is, by 
design, a derivative of the demand for the corresponding brand name drug that was 
generated by the brand name drug company during the period when the brand name 
drug company enjoyed the government-granted patent and/or marketing exclusivity.  
The use of generic drug products is primarily a result of the easy and routine 
substitution performed by pharmacists, using FDA certified AB-rated therapeutic 
equivalents according to the state drug product selection (generic substitution) 
statutes and regulations.  In other words, the doctor prescribes the brand name drug 
and the pharmacist easily and routinely substitutes the AB-rated generic version 
according to the drug substitution rules and regulations. This process of easy and 
routine substitution of AB-rated generics by the pharmacist is the manner in which: (i) 
the Hatch-Waxman Act framework was intended to, and does, facilitate generic drug 
competition; (ii) robust conversion of the market for a given molecule from the brand 
name drug product to its AB-rated generic equivalents is achieved; and, (iii) price 
competition among generics affords substantial savings to drug purchasers and 
consumers. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act framework encouraged generic drug manufacturers to 
develop and market AB-rated versions of brand name drug products that could be 
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approved and launched soon after the brand name drug exclusivity ends.  These AB-
rated generic versions were intended to be “therapeutically equivalent”, and were 
expected to largely, if not wholly, replace the prescriptions written for the brand name 
drug product.  The demand for the AB-rated generic versions was to be created 
through the easy and routine substitution process and lower generic prices, and not 
by differentiation based on heavy promotion.  Consequently, heavy marketing of a 
generic drug product after generic entry would be a highly inefficient use of 
resources from a societal perspective. 
1.3.3. Measures of Generic Substitution 
Several key terms related to generic substitution will be used in a specific way in this 
research study. First, the term ‘generic substitution’ is defined. Then, three measures 
of generic substitution are defined: (1) the net generic rate; (2) 
Generic Substitution: Generic substitution is the substitution of one drug product for 
another drug product only when both drug products have been shown to be 
therapeutically equivalent to the same reference listed drug product (RLD). Generic 
substitution may also include substitution of a therapeutically equivalent drug product 
for the reference listed drug product (i.e., the original brand name drug product 
approved for marketing). As discussed above, drug products that are ‘therapeutic 
equivalents’ and which can be treated as ‘generic substitutes’ must have the same 
drug molecule and salt, the same dosage form, the same strength, and the same 
route of administration and they are expected to produce the same clinical effect and 
safety profile as the prescribed product when administered under by the same route 
and with the same dosage regimen.36 
Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR): Generic Prescribing Rate is defined as the 
number of innovator multi-source drug units and non-innovator multi-source drug 
units divided by the number of all drug units (i.e., single source, innovator multi-
source and non-innovator multi-source) that were prescribed in a specific period of 
time. In essence the GPR is the percentage of all prescriptions where the drug 
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product prescribed was a generic drug product or could have been filled with a 
generic drug product. The formula is:  
NGR = (IMS + NMS) / (SS + IMS + NMS). 
Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR): Generic Dispensing Rate is defined as the 
number of non-innovator multi-source drug units (e.g., dollars, prescriptions, or daily 
doses) divided by the sum of the innovator multi-source drug units and the non-
innovator multi-source drug units that were dispensed in a specific period of time. 
This rate determines how frequently a generic drug product is dispensed when a 
generic version of the drug product prescribed is in the market. This concept is 
sometimes described as the generic “penetration” or “efficacy” rate.37 The formula is:  
GDR = NMS / (IMS + NMS). 
Net Generic Rate (NGR):  Net Generic Rate is defined as the number of non-
innovator multi-source drug units (e.g., dollars, prescriptions, or daily doses) divided 
by the number of all drug units (i.e., single source, innovator multi-source and non-
innovator multi-source) that were dispensed in a specific period of time. The formula 
is:  
NGR = NMS / (SS + IMS + NMS). 
 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The primary research objective for this study is to calculate estimate the rates of generic 
substitution (i.e., “Generic Prescribing Rate”, “Generic Dispensing Rate” and “Net 
Generic Rate”) in the Medicaid program between 1991 and 2008 and to determine and 
understand how state regulations influence the process of prescribing and dispensing 
generic drugs in the state Medicaid programs. Several specific research questions are 
addressed by this research project to accomplish the primary objective. 
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1.4.1 Research Question 1 
What are the Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) trends in the Medicaid program for the 
United States as a whole, and by state, over time from 1991 to 2008? 
Objective 1. Calculate the Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) for the Medicaid program 
for the United States as a whole, and by state, over time from 1991 to 2008.  
1.4.2 Research Question 2 
What are the Generic Dispensing Prescribing Rate (GDR) trends in the Medicaid 
program for the United States as a whole, and by state, over time from 1991 to 2008? 
Objective 2. Calculate the Generic Prescribing Rate (GDR) for the Medicaid program 
for the United States as a whole, and by state, over time from 1991 to 2008.  
1.4.3 Research Question 3 
What are the Net Generic Rate (NGR) trends in the Medicaid program for the United 
States as a whole, and by state, over time from 1991 to 2008? 
Objective 3. Calculate the Net Generic Rate (NGR) for the Medicaid program for the 
United States as a whole, and by state, over time from 1991 to 2008.  
1.4.4 Research Question 4 
What are the key regulatory and financial incentive policies and factors influencing the 
generic trends (Generic Prescribing Rate, Generic Dispensing Rate, and Net Generic 
Rate) for the Medicaid program for the United States as a whole, and by state, over time 
from 1991 to 2008? 
Objective 4. Determine the key regulatory and financial incentive policies and factors 
influencing the Medicaid generic (Generic Prescribing Rate, Generic Dispensing Rate, 
and Net Generic Rate) for the Medicaid program for the United States as a whole, and by 
state, over time from 1991 to 2008. 
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1.5 DATA SOURCES AND RESEARCH METHODS 
This study utilizes several databases to answer the research questions and 
objectives that were mentioned before. First, utilization and expenditures were 
obtained from the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS), the “Medicaid 
State Drug Utilization Data” database was collected from 1991 to 2008. Data on drug 
products and their characteristics was obtained from Medi-Span’s Master Drug Data 
Base ® (MDDB) and Price-Check PC ®. Data related to the policy and regulatory 
environment in each state was drawn from the National Association of Boards of 
Pharmacy (NABP) ® data base and from the National Pharmaceutical Council’s 
publications on Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs 
(from 1990 to 2007). Also, other sources were used to provide more details related to 
specific variables that were in the study and to better understand the market. 
The frame of reference for this study was the U.S. Medicaid program with the data 
for all drug claims at the national drug code (NDC) level by quarter and state for the 
years from 1991 to 2008. The primary objective was to analyze the generic utilization 
rates and factors that influence them for the United States Medicaid program as a 
whole and over time. Similar analysis was done on a state by state basis. The 
analysis examined generic utilization rates across the States over time and tested to 
determine if the specific generic substitution regulations and policies influenced the 
performance with statistically significant differences. The unit of analysis in this study 
was a specific drug product at the NDC level for a specific state and for a specific 
time period by quarter and year.  
First, descriptive analysis was performed to show the overall trends of the Generic 
Prescribing Rate, Generic Dispensing Rate, and Net Generic Rate.  The descriptive 
analysis was conducted nationwide and by state. Then, specific analyses were done 
with one specific generic rate at a time as the primary dependent variable and with 
various financial policy and regulatory variables as explanatory factors. A fixed effect, 
two-way least squares regression was utilized to analyze specific models. 
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1.6 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Appropriate utilization of lower-cost generic drug products is perhaps the single most 
effective cost containment tool for a prescription drug benefit. There is substantial 
evidence in the literature showing savings from generic substitution, but there is not 
much analysis of the various methods and policies that influence generic 
substitution. Therefore, the overall objective of this study is to evaluate the influence 
that specific financial policies and regulations may have on generic substitution. 
While this study focuses on generic substitution in state Medicaid drug programs, the 
findings will also be useful for private prescription drug benefit programs. 
This study measures three specific generic rates: (1) Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR), 
(2) Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR), and (3) Net Generic Rate (NGR). The first two of 
these rates measure intermediate steps that reflect the actions of physician (i.e., 
GPR) and pharmacist (GDR). The overall impact is measured with the Net Generic 
Rate (NGR).  
The framework for the generic rates calculated in this study was the number of 
generics as a percent of all drug products that are available as exact generic 
substitutes (i.e., drug products that are therapeutically equivalent, that is exact 
generic substitutes). This level can be referred to as the ‘generic substitute’ market 
level. One could also look at generics rates as a percent of all drug products for the 
same molecule (e.g., all drug products containing diltiazem in any dose form, 
strength, or salt form). This level is referred to as the “chemical entity’ market level. A 
third approach to examining generic rates would be to look at all drug products that 
could be used for the same therapeutic purpose (e.g., ulcer therapies). This level of 
analysis is referred to as the therapeutical market level.  
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 1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY  
The finding of this research should be understood and interpreted within the scope of 
the study as described here. 
First, the data set for this study was the complete set of all drug products provided to 
beneficiaries of the Medicaid program for each state and quarter from 1991 to 2008. 
Since the data is only reported at a quarterly level (i.e., 3 month blocks) the entry of 
generics in the market could be at the beginning of a quarter or the middle of a 
quarter or at the end of a quarter. Therefore, the generic rate reported in the first 
quarter after generic entry could differ depending on the proportion of time in the 
quarter that the generic was actually on the market. This issue in subsequent 
quarters is not an issue. 
Second, one of the limitations of the study is the effect that Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising (DTCA) may produce on the process of prescribing. For example, DTCA 
may lead patients to ask for, and doctors to prescribe, a single-source brand name 
drug product when the doctor might otherwise have prescribed a drug that is 
generically available and that is at least as safe and as effective and is available at a 
lower price. If doctors prescribe fewer drug products that have possible generic 
substitutes the net generic rate (NGR) will be lower. The effect of DTCA was 
captured but was combined with other effects as well. Therefore, it was not possible 
to separate and to infer how much the DTCA influences this process.   
Third, a given physician may have a preference for either brand name drug products 
or generic drug products that will affect his or her prescribing patterns.  This study 
does not have an explicit measure of individual physician preferences, although the 
aggregate generic prescribing rate and the net generic rate calculated and reported 
in this study have such preferences inherent within the aggregate rates. Similarly, a 
given pharmacist may have various reasons for preferring to dispense a brand name 
drug product or a generic drug product when possible. This study does not have an 
explicit measure of individual pharmacist preferences, although the aggregate 
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generic dispensing rate and the net generic rate calculated and reported in this study 
have such preferences inherent within the aggregate rates.  
Fourth, generic dispensing may have been affected by interruptions in the supply of 
generic drug products. In other words, a generic may have been approved for 
marketing, but for some reason the generic drug product may be in short supply or 
may not be in stock at the pharmacy when a prescription is dispensed. This study 
had no way of measuring this supply effect on the generic rates calculated and 
reported.  
Finally, there are times when a specific drug product (i.e., a certain brand name drug 
product) may be medically necessary when compared to the generic version of a 
drug product. For example, if a patient is allergic to a certain color of dye (e.g., FDC 
Yellow #2) and that dye is in the generic versions but not the brand name version of 
the drug product, the physician may indicate that the brand is “medically necessary”. 
The data set used for this study did not have any patient specific data or prescribing 
records that could identify when the use of the brand name drug product was 
considered to be medically necessary. This effect on generic dispensing is thought to 
be so small, in general, that it should not substantially influence the generic rates 
observed. However, this effect was not explicitly measured in the data set used.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the events that happened in the last fifty 
years in the pharmaceutical industry. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
After World War II there was an enormous increase in the development of new and 
potent drug entities. For that reason, the U.S. government was very concerned about 
regulating what kinds of medications were provided to consumers. 
In the early years of the 1900s the Food and Drug Act (1906) legislated that a drug 
needed to be properly labeled but it did not have to be safe. As a result, in 1938 the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was enacted and at this time, is was endorsed saying 
that drugs or cosmetics had to be tested for toxicity before marketing and in addition, 
enough information for its use needed to be on in the package and it made first 
mention of "use by instruction from physician only". 
In 1952, the Durham-Humphrey Amendment was enacted and explicitly defined two 
specific categories for medications: prescription and over-the-counter (OTC). 
Prescriptions drugs can only be dispensed with direct medical supervision or health 
practitioner. OTC drugs can be purchased and used without a prescription. 1 
Subsequently, in 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments was authorized but it wasn't 
until 1962, in the wake of the Thalidomide situation (a drug given to pregnant women 
for morning sickness that caused severe birth defects), that amendments were 
added saying that a drug had to be effective for what it was intended and 
that approval had to be given before trials on humans could be conducted, in 
consequence creating the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  Investigation of 
existing drugs' effectiveness began in 1964 and by 1974, 6,133 drugs had been 
removed for ineffectiveness.2  
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Also, the market was very lucrative. From 1960 to 1982, the average return rate for 
the pharmaceutical industry was 18.5 percent and in the same period time the 
average annual return rate for all manufacturing in the United States was 12.1 
percent. That produced a public policy explosion to decrease drug costs. 3 
Moreover, the standards to make medications during that period time were not very 
high. For that reason, companies were allowed to produce products with minimum 
requirements. The reputation of generic drugs was very low and companies that 
produced brand name drugs were in charge of promoting the value of drugs and so 
disqualified generics companies.  
At the same time, the FDA had been responsible for monitoring the quality of drugs 
since 1931, but initially was just concerned about counterfeiting, misbranding, and 
fraud. After that, in 1938, the FDA changed roles and was more focused on the new 
drug approval process which proved that drugs were safe and effective and if they 
were not the FDA was allowed to prosecute the companies. 
Finally, the issue of substitution of drugs was very important. Pharmacists were 
allowed to dispense any labeler’s product as long as it matched the active 
ingredients requested on the physician’s prescriptions until the 1950s. But with the 
problems mentioned before, the government was focused on improving the 
standards for the new medications and also controlling the substitution. 
 
2.2 MARKET OVERVIEW 
 
Commodities are goods or things of value with uniform quality, produced in large 
quantities by many different manufacturers. The items from each different producer 
are considered equivalent. A commodity has a demand but the product is without 
quantitative differentiation across the market and is exchangeable no matter who 
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produces it. One of the unique aspects of a commodity is that its price is determined 
as a function of its market. Essentially, goods that previously carried premium 
margins for market participants have become commodities, generic pharmaceuticals 
are such an example. 
In a competitive market the purchaser will not pay more than the market clearing 
price of a particular good. That price is a function of the quantity demanded by 
purchaser, and the quantity supplied by producers, resulting in an economic 
equilibrium of price and quantity. Generic pharmaceuticals can be thought of as 
commodities in the sense that a knowledgeable purchaser (Pharmacist) sees no 
difference in quality across competing generics and bases the purchasing decision 
on price.     
Elasticity is an essential concept in the theory of supply and demand that explains 
how supply and demand responds to a variety of factors, including price as well as 
other stochastic principles. Elasticity is defined as the ratio of the percent change in 
one variable to the percent change in another variable and it corresponds to the 
slope of the demand curve. An "elastic" good is one whose price elasticity of demand 
has a magnitude greater than one. Similarly, "unit elastic" and "inelastic" explain 
goods with price elasticity having a magnitude of one and less than one respectively. 
A good or service is considered to be highly elastic if a slight change in price leads to 
a sharp change in the quantity demanded or supplied. Usually these kinds of 
products are available in the market and can be thought of as needs. On the other 
hand, an inelastic good or service is one in which changes in price witness only 
modest changes in the quantity demanded or supplied. These goods tend to be 
things that are more of a necessity to the consumer. 
As the price of a good rises, consumers will usually demand a lower quantity of that 
good; they may consume less of that good, substitute it with another product, etc. 
The greater the extent to which demand falls as price rises, the greater the price 
elasticity of demand. Consequently, as the price of a good goes down, consumers 
will usually demand a greater quantity of that good: consuming more, dropping 
substitutes, etc. However, there may be some goods of which consumers cannot 
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consume less or for which adequate substitutes cannot be found. Prescription drugs 
are such goods, demand does not greatly decrease as the price rises, and elasticity 
of demand can be considered low, except when there is a generic substitution. 
Generic drugs can be considered “perfect substitutes” for branded drugs; as a result 
these are commodities with mainly elastic price. 
2.2.1 PRICE 
 
Price and price structure have always been a complicated part of the pharmaceutical 
industry. The price has to be established high enough to finance the degree of 
product competition required to maintain market position. For pharmaceutical 
products that compete with each other, the price structure will normally reflect the 
price that can help to capture the market without driving customers to move to 
substitutes. For a new product, the price structure will usually reflect a price higher 
than those of potential substitutes.  The higher price and the justification for why they 
are that expensive has always been a controversial issue.  
Prices of specific drugs tend to stay at relatively high levels until market position is 
susceptible to competition - when the patent expires - and lower priced generic 
equivalents arrive to the market. In general, price competition is presented in 
pharmaceuticals when the drugs are older, standardized, and non-patented or 
patent-expired products. When entry does happen, prices tend to drop or go up, 
depending on the analytic approach of the company that is marketing the 
competitors (generics). 
Also, legislation (patent, line extension and others) is an important external 
component of the price because even though it was created to produce market 
competition, it has generated a monopoly that companies have used to extend 
patents and create a market niche where the manufacturer does not have 
competition and can increase its revenue. In a study in 1984 researchers measured 
continued price rigidity, and they found that price rigidity was due to product-line 
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extensions that brand-name drug firms introduced for their patent-expiring brand-
name drugs. 4  
Furthermore, in another study in 2006, researchers said that there are three 
important factors that can delay the optimization of savings from generic drug use. 
First, generic drugs are frequently late to the U.S. marketplace after the expiration of 
the patent or other Intellectual Property protection; second, generic prices can stay 
high because the Hatch-Waxman Act gives six months of exclusivity to the first 
generic product on the market; and finally, physicians can be slow to switch to 
generic versions of brand name pharmaceuticals, and payers formularies often do 
not require such substitution. 5 
During the period of 1950 to 1981, national costs for retail drugs and medical 
miscellaneous increased about 9.3 percent annually from $1.7 billion in 1950 to $3.7 
billion in 1960, $8 billion in 1970, $19.3 billion in 1980 and $21.4 billion in 1981.6  
In addition, between 1982 and 1992, the producer price index for prescription drugs 
rose at an annual average rate of 8.4 percent. At the same time the index for all 
commodities at wholesale increased by 1.6 percent and the price index for all 
medical care rose at a 7.4 percent rate. 7 
Another important attribute of the pharmaceutical industry has been its 
extraordinarily high reported profitability. Between 1960 and 1991, pharmaceuticals 
ranked first or second for 24 out of 32 years on Fortune magazine's annual 
tabulation of median after-tax profit returns on stockholders' equity for its 500 largest 
industrial corporations, classified into between 21 and 28 industry categories. 8 
Even with the entire arguments presented thus far, there was a considerable decline 
in the prices of pharmaceuticals from 1960 through 1968, and that was in contrast 
with the significant inflation in the prices of other medical care goods and services 
and in overall prices. During the period of 1960 to 1968, the medical care price index 
rose twice as fast as the consumer price index, in overload of 30 percent. All these 
were followed by a five year period of relative price stability for pharmaceuticals, 
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while inflation continued unabated in the medical care sector and in the overall 
economy. 9 
A study in 1992 shows that from 1981 through 1988 the manufacturer drug price 
index for all drugs increased at an average of 9.1percent in 1981 to 83.5 percent in 
1988, and the retail drug price index increased at an annual average of 7.2 percent 
in 1981 to 62.6 percent in 1988. 10 
Finally, pharmaceutical manufacturers always argue that they work in a competitive 
environment. The total market for any specific drug is determined by the number of 
subjects that have the illnesses which that drug will be used to treat. A new product 
can have some market share only at the price of other products with similar 
therapeutic effects. Any product, even a well-established one, can find its position 
rapidly in the market but lose its position by a successful introduction of a new 
therapeutic advance. Price can be one of the factors that determine how much 
market share a product will have. 
2.2.2 PROMOTION 
 
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most advertising-intensive industries in the 
world. As early as 1900 the pharmaceutical industry was doing drug promotion at all 
the market levels (physicians and patients). Their promotional techniques have 
ranged from simple advertising in newspapers to Direct to Consumer Advertising 
(DTCA) on TV. The argument of the industry is that consumers (physicians and 
patients) need explanations of the value of particular brands and brand-name 
products and to persuade them of their use. This behavior has been regarded by 
opponents as one of the components that contribute to the high drug prices. 
Research has confirmed this argument, by showing that expenditures for advertising 
range from 15 percent in the United Kingdom to 22 percent in Italy, Germany, and 
the United States. 11  
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The first drug advertisement ever recorded was in 1708 in Boston by Nicholas Boone 
who published a medicine patent in an American newspaper 12. In 1962, the 
Kefauver-Harris drug amendments changed pharmaceutical advertising and 
represented the first time that a regulation was made for that purpose. That time they 
stated that advertisements must have four basic components: they cannot be false or 
confusing; they must describe a fair equilibrium of information about the risks and 
benefits of using the medication; they must include details that are of substance to 
the product’s advertised uses; and finally, in general the publicity has to contain a 
brief review of the drug including each risk from the product approval labeling. 13 
Prior to the early 1980s, pharmaceutical companies promoted their prescription 
products exclusively to physicians, who were anticipated to proceed as educated 
mediators interpreting drug information for the patients. After 1981 drug promotion 
was open to the final consumers as advertising on TV, in magazines, and through 
massive communication media. A survey that was conducted in eighteen commercial 
magazines from 1989 to 1998 discovered a total of 320 different DTCAs representing 
101 brands and 14 categories of medical conditions 14 
Opinions about DTCA are diverse. In 1997, a study conducted by US family 
physicians found that four fifths believed that DTCA was “not a good idea” since it 
increased expenditure and promoted confusing and unfair views of drugs 15. Another 
survey of 1,500 patients regarded to DTCA promotion as useful with 62% saying that 
DTCA helped them discuss their health with physicians. However, 58% said that 
advertising makes medications look better than they are. 16 
Either way the influence of drug promotion by pharmaceutical firms may become 
even more important than drug manufacturing. An example of DTCA advertising’s 
growth and its effect on drug sales was in a study released by the National Institute 
for Health Care Management Research and Education (NIHCM). They found that 
pharmaceutical companies spent $1.8 billion on DTC advertising in 1999, up 38.5 
percent from the $1.3 billion spent in 1998 and 33 times the $55 million spent in 
1991. Television ads accounted for $1.1 billion of the expenditure in 1998. 17 
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The same institute conducted a study in 2001 where they found that retail 
prescription drug spending in the United States increased to approximately $131.9 
billion in 2000, from $111.1 billion in 1999. The study found that sales of the 50 drugs 
most seriously advertised directly to consumers accounted for 40% of this increase. 
The approximately 9,850 other prescription medicines sold in the United States were 
responsible for the remaining 60% of the increase. The top 50 drugs represented 
$58.2 billion in 2000, approximately 44% of the total amount that Americans spent on 
all prescription drugs that year. 18 
Other ways that the pharmaceutical companies influence the industry are: support of 
conferences, symposium, and continuing education programs for physicians and 
pharmacists in the medical and pharmacy professions. Also the publication of the 
Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR), published by Medical Economics, represents a 
collection of paid marketing purchased by the major brand-name companies. The 
PDR includes materials approved by the FDA, and its advertisements closely 
resemble the approved package insert. 
Finally, the influence of drug promotion is an effective resource to provide drug 
information to physicians and to influence their prescribing behavior. The failure of 
most physicians to prescribe generic products, and of most pharmacists to dispense 
them when they are available at significant cost savings to the consumer, is directly 
related to the promotional efforts of the drug industry.  
 
2.2.3 PATENT 
 
Patents are an intellectual property protection that was created to give incentives for 
innovation in general. Patents and other varieties of protection remove the 
competition to a product for a period of time. In this period the originator can 
frequently charge premium prices, which guarantee a big return on what might have 
been a significant investment in research and development in any area of the 
market. The period where the products in a pharmaceutical market are protected by 
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patents is a major barrier to entry of products from competing firms. The average 
effective patent life for major pharmaceuticals in 2005 was 11 years. 19 
One of the big challenges in the market is the time and the investment to bring a 
drug to the market, the average time to develop a drug is between 10 to 15 years. Of 
the 5,000 to 10,000 compounds that are tested, just five will go to clinical trials and, 
only one will eventually obtain FDA approval and only two of 10 marketed drugs ever 
generate revenues that are equivalent or exceed R&D costs. 20 
The creation of an original drug product generally requires considerable investment 
in research and development, which is regularly absent from the resources of most 
small firms. Also small firms lack the capital to develop any patents for which they 
are the owners and the intensive research and development efforts of the larger 
firms usually establish patent umbrellas over all second-best products related to the 
primary advance so the chances to see small companies with blockbuster drugs are 
minimal. A current study from the Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug 
Development say that the average cost of developing a medication is $1.3 billion in 
2005 dollars, including the cost of failures and capital. 21 
Frequently patents are tradeoffs for consumers who can have easy access to the 
higher technology and better products, but this does not always happen because the 
high price limits the access to some privileged groups. 
In the pharmaceutical market the government has created a series of laws that has 
significantly increased the life of the drug and for that reason innovation in this 
market has been growing very fast. Some of the improvements that help medications 
continue in the market are extending the original patent; reducing the time in clinical 
testing and regulatory review; and establishing “market exclusivity” to drugs under 
certain conditions. 22 
Previous to 1994, patents in the pharmaceutical industry were covered for a period of 
17 years, giving the owner a legal monopoly over the production of a particular 
product or the employment of a particular production procedure. If the patent was not 
licensed for sale by any other firm, a patented drug represented an exclusive 
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chemical entity in that market. Now after the Uruguay Round Agreements (URAA) 
Act was passed patents last 20 years from the date of application. 
Patent life does not necessarily correspond with commercial life of a product; for 
example: the drug “enalapril” in Canada was off-patent in 2007 and that is 28 years 
after the initial patent was approved. 23 
The period of patent protection left over at the time of a New Drug Application (NDA) 
approval by the FDA has declined significantly from 13.6 years in 1966 to 9.5 years 
in 1979 (Caves et.al., 1991); but after the Waxman-Hatch Act (1984) there was an 
improvement in re-establishing the patent life and, according to a study conducted in 
Duke University, in the early 1990s the average patent life of new compounds was 
11.8 years. 24 
The reasons for these declines were because they decreased the time in patent-
pending and that produced faster processing of the application by the Patent Office. 
They increased the time between patent filing and clinical testing and the increase in 
the time between the beginning of clinical testing and NDA approval, since of the 
increased the requirements for NDA approval. 25 
Finally, all the changes in the market that had been created with the intention to help 
the consumer have more supply and better access to medications and helped the 
industry with incentives for innovation.  
 
2.3 SUBSTITUTION ISSUES 
2.3.1 ANTI-SUBSTITUTION LAW 
 
Between 1930 and 1950, the substitution practice of drug product selection was 
reasonably tolerated by pharmacists, physicians, and manufacturers. This was 
certainly appropriate in part due to the large percentage of prescriptions which were 
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compounded and the small proportion of drug preparations that were manufactured 
in final form.  
However, opponents were of the view that substitution was dangerous and pervasive 
during the 1950s. There was no concrete proof at that time that substitution of 
inferior quality products was happening, or patients were experiencing any significant 
adverse reactions as a result of substitution. 
Furthermore, with the end of World War II, there was an incredible increase in the 
development of new and potent drug entities; that produced a decrease in the 
amount of compounding done in pharmacies. Therefore, the pharmaceutical sales 
industry growth, especially among manufacturers of proprietary drug products 
increased. 
This period was also the beginning of marketing prescription drugs with lower 
standards and producing counterfeit products because there was no legislation that 
was concerned with the safety and efficacy of medications. Since then, legislators 
have become worried about substitution and counterfeiting. 
Therefore during the 1950s, U. S.  "Anti-substitution” laws were enacted and that 
was a response to the drug “counterfeiting” problem. In 1951 the Durham-Humphrey 
Amendment to the FD&C Act promoted this initiative by creating a new class of 
prescription-only drugs that cannot be safely used without medical supervision and 
restricting their sale to prescription by licensed practitioners. 26 
The state laws were supported mainly by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association (PMA), but other groups argued that these laws allowed drug 
manufacturers to increase their prices and profits under the pretense of protecting 
the consumer from drugs of questionable quality. Simultaneously, the American 
Pharmaceutical Association (APhA) also supported state anti-substitution laws to 
protect against legal responsibility in dispensing alleged counterfeit drugs.  
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In 1953, the New Jersey Board of Pharmacy was in the process of enforcing the anti-
substitution law and discovered that the substitution rate was 22 per cent of total 
prescriptions written for drugs that were likely to be substituted. Additionally in 1954, 
a chain drug store executive estimated that the brand substitution cost of major firms 
was $50 million per year. 27 
In that period Senator Estes Kefauver and a group of his committee initiated different 
research to see how the market was working. They found significant differences 
between prices for brand name and generic drugs that were equivalent products, and 
concluded that prescribing and substitution of non-brand name drugs should be 
extended. The 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments to the FD&C Act authorized the 
FDA to assure the effectiveness and safety of all drugs. This diminished the 
requirements of state anti-substitution laws which had been passed in answer to 
issues of drug efficacy and effectiveness. Other amendments required the FDA to 
establish generic names for products in order to make the public aware of the identity 
of trademark-named drug products.  
The regulations were, and remain, a major instrument used by the federal 
government to assure drug quality by setting standards for facilities and conditions 
under which drugs are manufactured. It was not until 1970 that the FDA initiated the 
Abbreviated New Drug Application process which covered drug safety and efficacy, 
and facilitated the introduction of generically-equivalent drugs. 28 
 
2.3.2 THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known 
as the Hatch-Waxman Act, signed into law by President Reagan on September 24, 
1984 (Soehnge, H. 2003), was created for two main reasons: to have generic 
medication available to the consumer with the lowest cost and to generate new 
incentives for research and development of products with pre-market approval by the 
government. 29 
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Furthermore, the act established an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) 
process for generic drugs marketing approval by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) (21 U.S.C. § 355). This idea was supported by consumer groups which 
lobbied Congress to pass legislation that would simplify the approval procedure for 
generic drugs whose brand name equivalents were already in the market. Previous 
to that, they were required to repeat expensive human clinical trials for all NDAs for 
generic equivalents of post-1962 pioneer drugs. Manufacturers requests for generic 
equivalents of pioneer drugs approved prior to 1962 were excused from the clinical 
testing requirement. The abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) procedure made 
it possible for generic drugs to be approved by the FDA if they were shown to be the 
"bioequivalent" of an approved drug and it would eliminate the expense and delay of 
proving the safety and effectiveness of a generic drug in clinical tests on humans 
when a pioneer drug manufacturer had already proven such requirements. 30 
On the other hand, the industry protested that the seventeen year patent term for 
pioneer (first to develop, manufacture and market new) drugs patented prior to 
receiving FDA approval was effectively reduced by the time that it took the FDA to 
approve the product for the market. The companies argued that, the loss of effective 
life of the patent was harmful since it reduced the incentive to invest in research and 
development of new and novel drug products. For that reason a method was created 
to re-establish the patent life of products pending pre-marketing approval by the 
FDA. 31 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act consist of: Title I, 
created a generic drug approval method for pioneer drugs approved after 1962, by 
amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Under these requirements, the 
FDA must approve the ANDA within 180 days from the time of filing if the applicant 
demonstrates that:  
1) The conditions for prescribed, recommended, or suggested use for the new 
generic drug have been previously approved for a prior drug; 32 
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2) The generic drug has the same active ingredient(s) as the prior approved drug; 33  
3) The generic drug uses the same route of administration, dosage form, and 
strength as the approved drug; 34 
4) The generic drug is the "bioequivalent" of an approved drug; 35 
5) The labeling proposed for the generic drug is the same as the labeling approved 
for the prior drug; 36 
Furthermore, the applicants must confirm that, either the generic drug is not 
patented, or, if it is or was patented, then the applicant has to verify: that the patent 
has expired, the date the patent will expire, or that the patent is invalid or will not be 
infringed. 37 Then if the generic drug is not patented or if the patent has expired, the 
approval is effective immediately. 
Additionally, if the generic drug is patented, then the approval is effective on the 
patent's expiration date. When the applicant certifies that the patent is invalid or will 
not be infringed, the effective date of approval may be delayed 180 days and if the 
patent owner does not file an action for patent infringements.  
Finally, Title II which implements the patent term restoration condition that provided 
twenty years patent term from the date on which the application for the patent was 
filed in the United States (The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, P.L. 103-465 was 
signed on December 8, 1994 but the effective date for the provisions was 6 months 
later, June 8, 1995) on certain products subject to pre-market approval, their method 
of use, or their method of manufacture. 38 
The inventors under this policy will be able to obtain a patent of “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof…..” 39, therefore if the inventor provided that is a novel discover 
a patent will give to him and that will give its owner "the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States . . ." for a term of 
twenty years. 40 
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In addition, the products that qualify for patent term extensions include drug 
products, medical devices, food additives, and color additives subject to regulation 
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 41 
Finally, the patent term remaining at the time of regulatory approval cannot be 
extended beyond fourteen years under the term extension provisions. 42 
 
2.4 PHYSICIANS PRESCRIBING BEHAVIOR 
 
Understanding the phenomenon of physicians prescribing behavior has always been 
important and complicated. In general, physicians are under a lot of pressure. It also 
depends on what type of institution they practice in. There are hospitals and clinics 
that are related to universities or institutions that practice research (Mayo Clinic, 
John Hopkins and others). Recent information is more accessible in these kinds of 
institutions. In contrast, hospitals and clinics that are located in rural areas or do not 
have any association with educational institutions update their information through 
journals, newsletters, and pharmaceutical representatives. 
Therefore, for the reasons that were mentioned before, the information that 
physicians receive is not always the same and is focused on clinical and therapeutic 
issues. The knowledge that physicians have about the cost of the medication is 
minimal. That is because they are more concentrated on the diagnosis of the disease 
and what drug works better than in the cost and access by the patient to the drug. 
Many studies about physician knowledge of drug cost and prescribing behavior say 
that they are willing to learn about the cost of the medication, but the lack of accurate 
information concerning actual cost and insurance coverage limits them in that area. 
Physicians have greater exposure to drug representatives, and that has been 
associated with prescribing higher cost medications, especially among primary care 
physicians. 43 
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In general, Americans consume lot medications per year and that is one of the 
reasons for the increase in drug expenditures. Therefore one of the gatekeepers in 
the market is physicians who are the first to have contact with a patient and they 
have the option to select the medication that patient needs.  In that context the 
primary target for prescription drug marketing is doctors.  
Many studies have documented that physicians are not familiar with prescription 
drug cost. One of the studies indicated that physicians consider drug cost in therapy 
decisions, but lack information and often make erroneous suppositions about the 
cost of medications prescribed. The study suggests that doctors could provide better 
cost-effective prescribing services and reduce costs if information about drug prices 
was readily available and if their medical education addressed drug cost. 44 
On average, the most common office visit is to a family physician, and family 
physicians write more than 30% of the prescriptions annually in the United States 
(Ernst et al., 2000). Rational cost-effective prescribing depends on accurate and 
timely information about the cost of medication, and in general, most of the 
physicians studied reported that they did not receive enough information concerning 
the cost of medications. They believed regular updates on medication costs would 
help to improve cost-effective prescribing.   
A number of studies have established that the education of physicians concerning 
drug prices can modify prescribing behavior and decrease costs by improving 
selection of cost-effective therapies. In 1983, a randomized controlled trial study 
found that physicians that were offered personal education visits by clinical 
pharmacists reduced their prescribing of the target drugs by 14 per cent as 
compared with doctors that did not received this kind of education. That percentage 
had a substantial cost savings in the reimbursed for these drugs. 45 
Finally, other studies to determine if clinical pharmacist education will affect 
physicians prescribing behavior show that there were improvements in the 
knowledge of drug costs and therapy when doctors received direct education.46 
Some authors think that physicians prescribing habits are relatively insensitive to 
cost information. A study where doctors had medication cost information in a 
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computer showed that the provision of real-time computerized drug cost information 
did not affect overall prescription drug cost to the patient. 47 
2.5 PHARMACIST DISPENSING BEHAVIOR 
 
The role of the pharmacist has changed since the 1950’s. As mentioned, before 
1950 pharmacists were allowed to dispense any drug, and the only condition was 
that it had to be the same chemical entity that the physician prescribed. After 
significant problems during that time with generic medication, the role of the 
pharmacist changed from a person that dispensed a medication to a health 
professional that advised and gave the patient the best option for his or her 
treatment. 
Between 1960 and 1970 the campaign to substitute brand medications with generic 
drugs was very strong and pharmacists were not allowed to change what physicians 
prescribed. For that reason, the physicians’ market power was high. At that time anti-
substitution laws were passed by states where it became mandatory that 
pharmacists dispense the exact drug product that was prescribed by the physician 
specified with a brand name or generic name plus a specific manufacturer.48  At that 
time physicians were allowed to use two methods to prevent substitution: one was 
the two-line method where physicians sign the prescription “brand medically 
necessary” or “substitution allow” and in the latter case if the physician signed the 
prescription, pharmacists were allowed to substitute the medication. The method was 
called “active substitution methods”. 49 
Additionally, pharmacist education changed during the period before the law passed. 
Prior to that, it was focused on drug products, emphasizing chemistry, 
pharmaceutics, and the control and regulation of drug product delivery systems. 
However, because of the dramatically changing health care delivery system and the 
progressively changing role of pharmacists in the efficient and effective treatment of 
disease for the patient, education shifted to focus for practitioners in this area. 50 
 46 
   
 
A study conducted in 1982 revealed that 34 percent of pharmacists regularly 
substitute brand medication for generic when it is available. 51 That shows that anti-
substitution laws had a big impact on the pharmacist profession because 
pharmacists were pushed to take on roles that they were not allowed to take before, 
related to practice, interrelationship with patients, and the cost of the 
pharmaceuticals. 
Today, the gatekeeper in the health system is not just the physician. Now physicians 
are working together with the pharmacist to give the patient the best treatment but 
with even more efficacy and cost-effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER III: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The following chapter describes the study in detail. First, the description of the 
market level of the analysis. Second, a conceptual framework is explained. Third, the 
regression models and hypotheses of the study are clarified.  Fourth, a description of 
the data sources and the operationalization of the dependent and independent 
variables are described; and finally, econometric methods and models used to 
analyze the data are shown. 
3.1 Market Level of Analysis 
 
As mentioned before, this study could be conducted defining three market levels of 
analysis: the chemical entity; the therapeutic and the substitutable market level; but 
for the propose of this study, the analysis was at the substitutable market level, 
where we observed the effect of factors that encouraged  the utilization of generics in 
the market.  
3.1.1 Substitutable Market Level 
 
For the  purpose of this study, at the substitutable market level  information on the 
specific dosage form, strength and route of administration of the drug product was 
included, presentations that were pharmaceutical equivalents by the FDA and 
defined in the Approved Drug Product (Orange Book). In this level of the study, 
generic substitution was measured when it was available. A drug product 
presentation was considered substitutable when it was in the same fourteen-digit 
Generic Product Identifier (GPI) code and the therapeutically equivalent (TE) code 
allowed for it. 
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Drug products are pharmaceutically equivalent according to the FDA or considered 
therapeutically equivalent (TE) when they can be substituted and will produce the 
same clinical effect and safety profile as the innovator product. Those medications 
are only therapeutically equivalent (TE) if they meet these criteria: contain the same 
active ingredient(s); dosage form; route of administration; strength and if they are 
assigned by the FDA the same therapeutic equivalence codes starting with the letter 
"A."  
Therapeutic equivalence (TE) codes determine whether the FDA has evaluated a 
particular approved product as therapeutically equivalent to other pharmaceutically 
equivalent products and provide additional information on the basis of the FDA's 
evaluations. Examples of TE codes are: AA, AB, BC, etc. 
A drug product is considered to be a therapeutically equivalent  "A" rated only if a 
drug company's approved application contains enough scientific facts establishing 
through in vivo and/or in vitro studies, the bioequivalence of the product to a selected 
reference listed drug and those active ingredients or dosage forms for which no in 
vivo bioequivalence issue is known or suspected. Those products which the FDA 
does not estimate to be therapeutically equivalent are "B" rated.  
The fourteen-digit Generic Product Identifier (GPI) code was used to group the drug 
product presentations of the same chemical entity.  The table below shows how this 
code is defined by the Medi-Span.  
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Table 3.1.2 Generic Product Identifier (GPI) Structure defines by Medi-Span Master 
Drug Database (MDDB®) v2.0. 
GPI-Subset Representation Type 
12-xx-xx-xx-xx-xx-xx Drug Group *MISC. ENDOCRINE*
12-34-xx-xx-xx-xx-xx Drug Class *Posterior Pituitary**
12-34-56-xx-xx-xx-xx Drug Subclass *Vasopressin***
12-34-56-78-xx-xx-xx Drug Name Desmopressin
12-34-56-78-90-xx-xx Drug Name Acetate
12-34-56-78-90-12-xx Dosage Form Tablet
12-34-56-78-90-12-34 Strength 0.1MG
 
The Generic Product Identifier (GPI) is a code that categorizes drug products by a 
hierarchical therapeutic classification or pharmaceutically equivalent drug products. 
The 14-character GPI consists of a hierarchy of seven subsets. These subsets are 
structured and identified below: 
a. Drug Group: The two-character Drug Group (first subset) classifies general 
drug products.  
b. Drug Class: The four-character Drug Class (first and second subset) 
identifies specific therapeutic drug classes.  
c. Drug Subclass: The six-character Drug Subclass (first through third subset) is 
used if further distinction is needed within a Drug Class.  
d. Drug Name and Drug Name Extension: The eight-character Drug Name (first 
through fourth subset) designates basic drug moiety (when it exists as a 
product). Alternately, the ten-character Drug Name Extension (first through 
fifth subset) designates the specific drug salt, when applicable.  
e. Dosage Form and Strength: The eleventh and twelfth characters (sixth 
subset) identify the drug product’s dosage form. The thirteenth and fourteenth 
characters (seventh subset) differentiate various strengths and routes of 
administration.  
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3.1.2 Other Markets Level (Therapeutic and Chemical Entity) 
 
The Therapeutic and Chemical Entity market levels were not included in this study 
but are left for future studies or analysis. We will provide some characteristics of 
them.   
At the therapeutic market level the information included all the chemical entities that 
are available by class. That includes: single and multi-source medication that can be 
interchanged if they are available. At this level a 6 digit GPI code is a suggested 
variable to identify the cluster of drug product presentation within the class. 
The chemical entity market level included information on the specific dosage form, 
strength, therapeutic equivalency code and route of administration by each molecule 
that is available. This level of the study measures if the therapeutic substitution was 
done or not. At this level an 8 or 10 digit GPI code is a recommended variable to 
identify the cluster of drug product presentations of the same chemical entity.   
 
3.2 Empirical Model of Factors that Influence Market 
Levels 
3.2.1 Conceptual Framework for the Substitution Level of 
Analysis 
 
A typical industry or market is defined with many firms that have ease of entry and 
way out of the market. Commonly in that market, firms have the ability to differentiate 
their products and companies maximize profit and set the price and the quantities of 
production depending on the market's structure.  
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There are other markets like oligopolies (dominated by a small number of sellers) 
and monopolies (dominated by a one seller) where competitive firms are price 
setters and there are barriers to entry that make the access complicated for other 
companies or competitors, and that created market power to the firms.  
In the pharmaceutical market, where medications have different stages during their 
life cycle, the market started as a monopoly, where you have one company supplying 
the medication (brand drugs) to an oligopoly market, where small number of 
companies produce a product (generic drugs). These products are nominated as 
“perfect substitutes” products (Welage, Kirking, Ascione & Gaither. 2001) i or 
“homogeneous products” and are considered commodities by any economics 
consideration. 
 Based on industry organization explained previously, where pharmaceutical 
companies compete, there are economics model that could explain the behavior of 
the industry; these models can be separated into the consumer perspective (demand 
side) and the manufacturer perspective (supply side).  
Example of “manufacturer perspective” is the case of the Bertrand model ii; 
according to the Bertrand model, companies that produce the homogenous product 
compete in price until they reach the marginal cost (they don’t set price below, 
otherwise they don’t have any profit) and this is how they capture the market. 
Furthermore, we have the model that explains competition by knowing the quantity, 
that is the case of Stackelberg iii or Cournot iv competition. Both of them, basically 
explain these competitions as the game theory, where one of the firms or suppliers in 
the market is the one that makes the first move and the other competitors in the 
market follow until the other decides to make another move. These two types of 
models can explain some part of the system; they cannot capture the complete 
dynamic of the pharmaceutical market. 
The theory of Market Segmentation v can be used to explain the pharmaceutical 
market; where we have many sub-sets (for example: class of drugs, therapeutics 
class, etc) where consumers with one or more characteristics demand similar drugs 
based on qualities of those goods, such as price.  
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The segmentation in the pharmaceutical market can be made in many different 
ways, e.g.: by types of disease, mechanics of action, type of patent protection (an 
example of that is Orphan drugs or medication for children), and others. But the 
common criterion is to create homogeneous segments that have common needs and 
can be reached by a market intervention.  
While, there may be theoretically 'ideal' market segments, in fact, every organization 
engaged in a market will develop different ways to fragment the market, and 
create product differentiation strategies to exploit different segments. The market 
segmentation and corresponding product differentiation strategy can give a firm a 
temporary commercial advantage. 
Market segmentation model could explain the separations of the market into generics 
and brand medications, but does not explain the structure and behavior of the 
pharmaceutical industry and how this segmentation is created. Therefore, other 
conditions in the pharmaceutical market in addition to price differences between 
generic and brand medications influence in the demand for generic drugs products.  
 
3.2.2 Conceptual Model of Factors that Influence Generic 
Substitution at State and National Level 
 
In a pharmaceutical market there are many exogenous and endogenous variables 
that will determine how a specific model will work. In our specific case, substitution 
regulation policy and financial incentives are the endogenous variables that will 
influence generic rate in all the study. Nevertheless, there are many exogenous 
variables that will not be accounted in this study, but can influence in a small way 
how things are in the pharmaceutical arena; variables like: Federal Policies that 
influence every state or state budget, inflation, or economic environment. To attempt 
to capture the influence of the exogenous variables, Time was including as a variable 
to capture some of the influence that federal policy. 
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The following is a conceptual model of the factors that influenced the generic 
reimbursement rate at the state and national Level.  
 
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Generic Substitution Model: 
 
 
 
GSd,t,s = Generic Substitution by drug product d at the time t by State s 
SRPd,t,s = Substitution regulation Policy by drug product d at the time t by State s 
FIRPd,t,s = Financial incentives regulation Policy by drug product d at the time t by 
State s 
 
GSd t s 
 
MAd,t 
SRPd,t,s 
FIRPd,t,s 
+/- 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
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MAd,t = (Number of Generic Drugs/Total of Drugs) Market available by drug product d at the time 
t. 
The process of generic substitution could have many factors that influence the 
decision; these influences can be in a positive or negative way. The following will 
explain these factors and where we will obtain them. 
3.2.2.1 Substitution Regulation Policy 
 
There are many regulations at state level that can make the substitution of a brand 
drug with a generic drug incredibly simple or exceptionally difficult. Most of these 
factors or regulations were extracted from National Association of Boards of 
Pharmacy (NABP) publications. 
The following are the variables that influenced the generic rates, these were used to 
build the empirical model represented in Figure 3.2, to determine the factors that 
affect the generic rates at the market levels but does not mean that, there are not 
more factors that could or would influence the process of generic substitution.  
All of the variables from National Association of Board of Pharmacy (NABP) were 
considered dichotomous with values 0 & 1, to making sure that each of the variables 
effects were detected in the analysis.  
Generic Formulary (NABP) 
A Generic Formulary was defined as a variable that reports the type of formulary that 
each state has, using the concept of Approved Drug Product book (also known as 
the Orange Book). States can have a positive formulary, that means that generics 
may (or in some cases must) be dispensed if the drug appears on the formulary, or 
negative formularies that prohibit generic interchange of drugs on the list or don’t 
have a formulary. The variable was name as a Ph_Gf and separated in two: “Positive 
formulary” and “Non-Formulary”. Both of them coded as a dichotomous variable. 
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Orange Book Formulary (NABP) 
An Orange Book Formulary was defined as a variable that reports as a type of 
formulary (using the concept of Approved Drug Product book) that each state has. 
Those states authorize the pharmacist to substitute only drug products that are 
proved to be “therapeutically equivalent”, AB rate by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). The variable was name as a Ph_OB and separated in two: 
“Others List” and “Orange Book”. Both of them code as dichotomous variable (as was 
mention before) with values from 0 to 1. 
Discretion in generic substitution (permissive or mandatory) (NABP) 
Permissive or mandatory was defined as a regulation that encourages or requires 
that pharmacists substitute a medication that was prescribed when certain criteria 
are met. The variable was name as a Ph_Pm and code as a dichotomous with 
values 0 for permissive & 1 for mandatory. 
Method for Preventing Substitution (NABP) 
A method for preventing substitution was defined as one of several different 
alternatives that prevents or reduces the opportunities to substitute generically a 
prescription written by a physician. The variable was name as a Ph_Ps and 
separated in three: “Check Box”; “Initial” and “Write the Words”. All of them code as 
dichotomous variable (as was mention before) with values from 0 to 1. 
Requirement to pass-on cost savings to the consumer (NABP) 
A Saving Cost for Patients by transfer a portion or full of cost was defined as a 
regulation that obligates the pharmacist to pass on to the consumer all or part of the 
cost savings from dispensing a non-innovator multi-source drug. The variable was 
name as a Ph_Cs and separated in two: “Portion of Cost” & “Full Saving”. Both of them 
code as dichotomous variable (as was mention before) with values from 0 to 1. 
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Patient consent for generic substitution (NABP)  
Patient consent was defined as the requirement that a patient’s permission is 
necessary to substitute or that the patient has to be notified/informed of the 
substitution of his/her medication. The variable was name as a Ph_Pc and code as a 
dichotomous with yes and no answer but with values 0 & 1. 
3.2.2.2 Financial Incentives Regulation Policy 
 
One of the incentives that the exchange of brand drug for generic prescription has is 
financial. Pharmacists are able to maximize the profit of reimbursement if the 
substitution of the medications is possible. That is doable only if the state has a 
Maximum Allowed Cost (MAC) or Federal Upper Limit (FUL) program and the 
generic drug is included in that program. Also, in some states Medicaid has an 
incentive fee for generic substitution, and that is another economic incentive for 
substituting generic when the non-innovator multi-source drug is available and what 
the fee is by state.   
The variables that are included in this section are: 
Average Wholesaler Price (AWP) Discount 
An Average Wholesaler Price Discount was defined as a variable that reports the 
percentage that will be reduced from the Estimated Acquisition Cost (EAC) that for 
most states is calculated by using the Average Wholesaler Price (AWP) for a drug, 
less a percentage discount. The AWP is the price assigned to the drug by its 
manufacturer and is compiled by the Red Book, First DataBank, and Medi-Span for 
use by the pharmaceutical community.  
This discount also was separated by the different institutions or in different situations 
that are present in the market. The variables names are: amount basic discount 
(Awp_Discount_Basic), generic medication (Awp_Discount_Generic) & institutional, 
chain, low volume, independent (Awp_CHANNEL_Of_Distribution_A), this variable 
put together the different channels of distribution and code dichotomous with values 
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0 & 1, that represent the presence or absence of the groups involves. The other two 
variables: basic discount and discount generic were presented as a percentage (%).  
Dispensing Fee ($) 
A Dispensing Fee was defined as a variable that reports the amount of money ($) 
that was paid to the pharmacy by each prescription (Rx) by the different institutions 
or in different situations that are present in the market. The variables names are: 
amount per base rate (Df_Base_Rate), institutional (Df_Institutional), generic 
medication (Df_Generic), and unit dose (Df_Unit_Dose). All of variables were 
presented as a discount in $.  
 
3.3 Study Hypotheses   
 
The following are the hypotheses explaining generic rates in the study. It is important to 
understand that rates will be calculated when the result is greater than zero. Therefore 
any time that the numerator or denominator of the rate will be zero because one of the 
components of the formula is zero or the complete denominator or denominator is zero 
the rate will not be possible to be calculated. 
 
I. The Medicaid Generic Rate (generic prescribing rate, generic dispensing rate, 
and net generic rate) at the substitutable market level by therapeutic category 
at state and time level is given by the following equation:  
1. Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR)  
GPR = (IMS + NMS) / (SS + IMS + NMS) 
Where:   SS = Single Source drugs / IMS = Innovator Multi-Source drugs / NMS = Non-innovator Multi-Source 
drugs 
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GPRd,t =  ∫>0 ƒ [Substitution regulation Policyd,t, Financial incentives regulation Policyd,t ]. 
 
2. Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR)  
GDR = NMS / (IMS + NMS) 
Where:   IMS = Innovator Multi-Source drugs / NMS = Non-innovator Multi-Source drugs 
GDRd,t =     ∫>0 ƒ [Substitution regulation Policyd,t, Financial incentives regulation Policyd,t 
]. 
3. Net Generic Rate (NGR)  
NGR = NMS / (SS + IMS + NMS) 
Where: SS = Single Source drugs/ IMS = Innovator Multi-Source drugs / NMS = Non-innovator Multi-Source 
drugs 
NGRd,t =     ∫>0 ƒ [Substitution regulation Policyd,t, Financial incentives regulation Policyd,t 
]. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The Medicaid Generic Rate (generic prescribing rate, generic dispensing 
rate, and net generic rate) at the substitutable market level by therapeutic class at state 
and time is influenced by: 
SRPd,t, = Substitution regulation Policy by drug product d at the time t by State  
FIRPd,t, = Financial incentives regulation Policy by drug product d at the time t by 
State  
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II. The National Medicaid Generic Rate (generic prescribing rate, generic 
dispensing rate, and net generic rate) at the substitutable market level by state 
and time is given by the following equation:  
1. National Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR)  
NGPR = (IMS + NMS) / (SS + IMS + NMS) 
Where:   SS = Single Source drugs / IMS = Innovator Multi-Source drugs / NMS = Non-innovator Multi-Source 
drugs 
NGPRd,t,s =  ∫>0 ƒ [Substitution regulation Policyd,t,s, Financial incentives 
regulation Policyd,t,s ]. 
 
2. National Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR)  
NGDR = NMS / (IMS + NMS) 
Where:   IMS = Innovator Multi-Source drugs / NMS = Non-innovator Multi-Source drugs 
NGDRd,t,s =  ∫>0 ƒ [Substitution regulation Policyd,t,s, Financial incentives 
regulation Policyd,t,s ]. 
 
3. National Net Generic Rate (NGR)  
NNGR = NMS / (SS + IMS + NMS) 
Where: SS = Single Source drugs/ IMS = Innovator Multi-Source drugs / NMS = Non-innovator Multi-Source 
drugs 
NNGRd,t,s =  ∫>0 ƒ [Substitution regulation Policyd,t,s, Financial incentives 
regulation Policyd,t,s ]. 
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Hypothesis 2: The National Medicaid Generic Rate (generic prescribing rate, generic 
dispensing rate, and net generic rate) at the substitutable market level by state and time 
is influenced by: 
SRPd,t,s = Substitution regulation Policy by drug product d at the time t by State s 
FIRPd,t,s = Financial incentives regulation Policy by drug product d at the time t by 
State s 
3.4 Data Source and Sample Selection 
 
The study uses a different dataset from the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare 
Service (CMS), the “Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data” database, Medi-Span 
Master Drug Data Base ® (MDDB), Medi-Span Comprehensive Price History ® 
database, National Association of Board of Pharmacy (NABP) ® data and Medicaid 
Payment database (MPDB) and publications from different sources (Pink Sheet; 
MedAdNews and Orange Book) to create more details to understand the dependent 
and independent variable behavior. 
3.4.1 DATA SOURCES 
 
a. Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Service (CMS) --- Medicaid State Drug Utilization 
Data. 
The drug data from CMS provides drug expenditure and utilization data by quarters 
by year about Medicaid program from 1991 to 2008. This data was obtained from the 
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Service (CMS) for all the medications that were 
used in that time.   
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Medicaid State Drug Utilization data measures drug products that were used by 
Medicaid recipients in a specific period of the time. The data is by quarter (Q1: 
January1st to March 31st; Q2: April 1st to June 30; Q3: July 1st to September 30; & Q4: 
October 1st to December 31st) by year, and the sample represents the United States 
divided by all the states; excluding Tennessee and Arizona. 
Each state has information listed by National Drug Code (NDC), the name that the 
FDA gives to the product that was used, a total products that were reimbursed, by 
units and amount of money. The National Drug Code (NDC) is a list of drug products 
that is assigned an exclusive 11-digit, 3-section number that categorizes the labeler, 
product, and trade package size. A five-digit labeler code is allocated by the FDA 
and represents any company that produces (as well as repackers or relabelers), or 
distributes (under its own name) a drug product. The four-digit product code is given 
by the company and recognizes a particular strength, dosage form, and formulation 
for a specific company. Finally, the two-digit package code is given by the company 
and classifies package sizes and types. 
b. Medi-Span: Master Drug Database (MDDB)®, Wolters Kluwer Health 
Medi-Span Master Drug Data Base ® (MDDB) v2.0 is a data base that gives 
complete information about the drug product. The Medi-Span MDDB database was 
used in combination with Medicaid State Drug Utilization to obtain more detailed 
information on all the drug products that were available from 1991 to 2008.  
The Medi-Span MDDB database has information available about all drug products by 
National Drug Codes (NDCs) with capacity to link old and new NDCs; and that is 
linked with product names, strengths, package types and package size, patent 
status, over-the-counter status, therapeutic equivalency codes, therapeutic 
classification codes, Generic Product Identifier (GPI)® codes, manufacturer and 
repackager information, and current and historical drug pricing.   
 
The Medi-Span MDDB database has two files; both of them have the same 
variables. However, the first one has all the active NDC that were in the market up to 
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48 months of inactive products. The second one contains all the inactive NDC that 
were in the market since 1980 until 48 months before the active NDC.  
A Generic Product Identifier (GPI) ® code is a classification by MediSpan that 
defines pharmaceutically equivalent drug products. Products having the same 14-
character GPI are identical with respect to active ingredient(s), dosage form, route, 
and strength. The GPI does not consider identification of bioequivalence or 
therapeutic equivalency of drug products.  
c. Medi-Span: Comprehensive Price History ®, Wolters Kluwer Health  
Medi-Span’s Comprehensive Price History gives historical information on the price of 
drug products at the NDC level connected with drug products information. This data 
set includes all prices in Medi-Span’s Master Drug Data Base® for all National Drug 
Codes since the early 1980s. Medi-Span’s Comprehensive Price History ® is 
basically a small part of the Master Drug Data Base.  
d. National Association of Board of Pharmacy (NABP) 
The National Association of Board of Pharmacy (NABP) Survey of Pharmacy Law is 
an overview of pharmacy law by state. The survey explains states’ board 
organization, function, and requirements for pharmacist licensure in general. 
Additionally, it gives an overview of the laws that regulate the prescribing and 
dispensing of medications and professional standards. The Survey of Pharmacy 
Law, however, presents just a sample of the laws that regulate the profession of 
pharmacy.  
NABP’s Survey of Pharmacy Law provides a source for individuals who require an 
overview of the state laws, rules, and regulations that regulate pharmacy and its 
practice.  The survey is separated by section with the following information: overview 
of the institution and the authority of the state boards of pharmacy; information about 
pharmacist and pharmacy licensing issues; information related to the prescribing and 
dispensing of drugs (facsimile and electronic transmission of prescriptions, 
prescribing and dispensing authority, drug product selection, and patient 
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requirements) and finally the last section gives demographic information about 
pharmacists and pharmacies. 
For purposes of the study, NABP’s Survey of Pharmacy Law books from 1991 to 
2008 was used to obtain the information on states’ regulation related to substitution 
and pharmacy and pharmacist legislation by state.   
e. Medicaid Payment Data base (MPDB) 
The Medicaid Payment Data base (MPDB) is an economic group of factors (or 
variables) that can affect or influence a pharmacist in the decision making of 
dispensing a medication, when drugs has generic available or not. 
Medicaid Payment Data base (MPDB) was prepared by a consulting group for use in 
a lawsuit over manufacturer drug prices and their cost to Medicaid. 
 For purposes of the study, Medicaid Payment Data base (MPDB) was organized as 
a time series data from 1991 to 2008 and was used to obtain the information on 
states’ financial incentives when the exchange of brand drug for generic prescription 
has happened. 
f. FDA Approved Drug Product (Orange Book); Pink Sheet & MedAd News  
The FDA Approval Drug Product (Orange Book) classifies drug products that were 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (the Act) under the standards of safety and effectiveness.  FDA 
Orange Books were used to obtain information about the definition of exclusivity and 
substitution. 
Pink Sheet and MedAdNews are groups of magazines on the pharmaceutical market 
that give general details about new issues on the market (patent approved, patent 
litigations, generic approved, etc).  
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3.4.2 Sample Selection 
 
The data for the study was the entire population of drugs from 1991 to 2008 that 
were paid for the Medicaid program. The research analyzed the data nationwide and 
by state. The purpose of this is to explain how the rates perform and it was possible 
to observe significant differences across time and in different markets. 
3.4.3 Structure of the Dataset 
 
The Medicaid state drug utilization data was connected with other datasets by variables 
that are focused on drug policy (i.e., variables that give information about state regulation) 
and drug product (i.e., variables that give information about drug product). That is the 
main difference between the two sets. 
a. Medicaid State Drug Utilization data  
The Medicaid state drug utilization data were obtained from the Centers for Medicaid 
and Medicare Service (CMS) webpage from 1991 to 2008. The data are organized 
by individual files by state per quarter and per year in .TXT format that were 
converted to Stata and Excel format. There is missing data during the period of time 
that the data was collected.  The state of Arizona does not provide any report and 
the state of Tennessee does not have any record between 1995 and 1998 (four 
years). 
The variables that the data provide are: NDC codes, the state abbreviation, a product 
name, and total products unit that was reimbursed by units by numbers of Rxs and 
by amount of money. Therefore, those are the variables that give us the starting 
point to connect with other ones. 
b. Linking Medicaid State Drug Utilization data with Medi-Span: Master Drug Database 
(MDDB) ® & Comprehensive Price History ®, Wolters Kluwer Health  
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The Medicaid state drug utilization dataset did not include drug details; therefore the 
Medi-Span Master Drug Database (MDDB) ® and Comprehensive Price History ® 
are data bases that give in detail drug product information.  The Medi-Span Master 
Drug Database (MDDB) ® also has two datasets; both with the same variables. The 
difference between them is that one has all National Drug Codes (NDC) that are 
active in the market and the other one has all NDC that there are not active in the 
market. The three data bases were connected with Medicaid state drug utilization 
data by the National Drug Code (NDC) variable. The NDC variables will connect with 
the variables in the other data to be able to do the analysis by market level (by 
market levels we have to be able to recognize the patent status of each drug and in 
detail, the dosage form, route, strength and the name of the company that is 
marketing the drug). 
c. Linking the Medicaid Payment data base ® (MPDB) with National Association of 
Board of Pharmacy ® (NABP) 
The Medicaid state drug utilization dataset did not include state drug policy 
regulation; therefore the National Association of Board of Pharmacy (NABP) ® and 
the Medicaid Payment data base (MPDB) ®, were the data bases that provided us 
with details about state regulation information.  
Both databases (NABP ® & MPDB ®) were connected by the states’ initial variable, 
and the states’ initial variable was the connection with the dataset that contains each 
generic rate by state per quarter per year, to be able to create the models that 
determined the validity of the Generic Rates that is one of the primary goals of this 
project.   
d. FDA Approved Drug Product (Orange Book); Pink Sheet & MedAd News. 
FDA Approved Drug Product (Orange Book); Pink Sheet & MedAd News are 
complementary data that helped to understand the regulations in each state and 
details in the market. This complementary data were to be linked directly with any 
variables of any data mentioned before, but were supported with additional 
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information to have a better understanding of the factors that drive the drug 
substitution topic.  
3.5 Procedure of Unit of Analysis and Variables 
 
This section shows the process that was used for this study in the units of analysis, 
units of measurement, dependent variables, and independent variables at the 
substitutable market level. 
3.5.1 Procedure of Unit of Analysis at the Substitutable Market 
Level  
 
For the purpose of the study, a drug product presentation (i.e., a specific dosage 
form, strength, and route of administration) was considered substitutable when it had 
the same 14 GPI (in case of Multi-Source medication) code as the originator drug 
product presentation and the TEE code indicated that was the therapeutic 
equivalent.  
The Multi-Source Code was the key variable that was used to determine the patent 
status of the NDC medications across the time of the study. The variable was 
obtained from the MDDB®v2.0 and identifies drug products as either single or 
multiple-source original drug products or a generic copy of the standard drug 
product. The definitions of this variable are: 
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Table 3.1.3 Patent Status Code defines by Medi-Span Master Drug Database 
(MDDB®) v2.0.  
CODE Description
N Single-source drug product available from one manufacturer. The drug 
product is not generic, nor is it available as a generic.
M
Single-source, co-licensed Drug product that is co-licensed and not 
considered generic, nor is it available as a generic. The drug product is 
generally considered a single-source drug product despite multiple 
manufacturers.
O Original drug product considered to be the industry standard. These 
drug products are available from multiple manufacturers.
Y
Drug product available from multiple manufacturers. Often, this is a
copy of an original drug product valued as the standard.
 
Afterward, the calculation of the Generics rate was performed by merging Medicaid 
State Drug Utilization data with data from the Master Drug Database (MDDB) and 
Medi-Span Comprehensive Price history data. These datasets provide us with the 
variables that help create a dataset across the period 1991 until 2008 (per quarter) 
with the patent status by NDC with all the changes that happened in the life period of 
the drug over the 17 years.   
However, even though Medicaid State Drug Utilization data was with panel structure; 
Master Drug Database (MDDB) and Medi-Span Comprehensive Price history data 
were not. Therefore, to be able to reach our goal, several adjustments were making. 
First, using 14 GPI code that helps to put together medications that were 
substitutable, was created a new code call 16 GPI, that basically was 14 GPI plus 
two more digit that represent Rx (01) and OTC (02).  
Second, Master Drug Database (MDDB) has a Multi-Source Code that represent the 
patent status of each NDC code, but that code is cross-sectional (means that give 
the information for that specific NDC in the last two years, therefore for the purpose 
of our study and using enclosed literature, a panel data was re-created with a Multi-
Source Code but capturing the status changes for each NDC, as a result, in the 18 
years of study, were able to identified when NDC change from a Single Source drugs 
to a non-innovator multiple source (typical know a Generic medication). 
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Finally, other variable from Medi-Span Master Drug Database (MDDB®) that was 
used was Patent Status Code that variable defines each of the different status that 
an NDC can have and they were defines as: N, M O & Y (please see above for more 
details). Therefore, because each of the generic rates was defines with different 
nomenclature: SS: Single Source; IMS: Innovator Multisource & NMS: Non-Innovator 
Multisource. Codes were adjusted to be able to calculate in accurately way the 
Generic rates. 
Finally, the unit of analysis at the substitutable market level was generic rate 
(Generic Prescribing Rate, Generic Dispensing Rate & Net Generic Rate) by state by 
quarter by year. 
3.5.2 Variables at the Substitutable Market Level 
 
a. Dependent Variable 
At the substitutable market level of analysis the dependent variable was a generic 
rate. Therefore these are: (1) generic prescribing rate; (2) generic dispensing rate 
and (3) net generic rate. The dependent variable was calculated by state by quarter 
and by year. These rates were expressed in terms of percentage of prescriptions 
(Rxs) and the percentage of prescription expenditures ($). 
 
b. Independent Variables 
The independent variables across the substitutable market level that will be used to 
test our hypothesis and reach our goal to observe what influence generic rates are 
mentioned in sections 3.2.2 Substitution regulation Policy and 3.2.3 Financial 
incentives regulation Policy; therefore, will not be repeat again.  
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3.6 Econometric Analytic Methods 
 
The data set that was used in the study is an unbalanced cross-sectional times 
series data. The data sets merge data across the time (time series data) with data 
observed at some point in time (cross sectional units), the cross sectional units 
present several points of information in time. The unbalanced panel data set used for 
the study has different time periods observed for the expenditures that Medicaid had 
consumed for different cross sections. 
A typical data set can be described with a linear regression model; a multiple 
regression analysis is used to model a relationship between a dependent variable 
and multiple predictor variables.  A typical multiple regression model can be as 
follows:  
Yi = α0 + α1 X i1 + α2 Xi2 + ……. αk Xik + εi 
Where Yi  is the dependent variable that answer in the i th trial, X i1, Xi2,…… Xik 
are the independent variables that are the values of k predictor variables in the i th 
trial, and εi is a random error that represents the difference between the actual or the 
observed value of Yi and the value of Yi estimated by the k predictor variables.   
In a panel data analysis one of the advantages is the flexibility of modeling 
differences in performance across the individuals, therefore the regression model is 
different from the linear regression model. For the purpose of this study, the 
regression model that describes our research has that form: 
Yit = x i1 β + zi α + εit   i=1,…..n and t=1,…..T 
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Where Yit represents the dependent variable, x it contains K independent variables, 
and εit is an error term.  i represents the number of cross sectional units, and t 
represents the time periods the data was observed for the cross sections. 
The majority of panel data has more cross sectional units than time periods. As a 
result, heterogeneity across cross-sectional units is the focus of panel data analysis.  
The heterogeneity is distinguished by zi α where zi is a group of individual or 
specific variables, which may be observed or unobserved. Therefore, if zi is 
observed for all individuals, then the model can be fitted by ordinary least squares 
(Greene, 2003). The techniques for dealing with heterogeneity in panel data are 
called fixed effects and random effects.  
The fixed effects technique, zi α contains a group of specific constant terms in the 
regression model.  The regression model, in this case is: 
Yit = x it β + α i + εit   i=1,…..n and t=1,…..T 
Where α i contains all the observable effects and specifies an estimable conditional 
mean and that indicates that the terms does not vary over time. (Greene, 2003)  
Therefore, for purpose of this study is to be able to capture effects across units and 
in-groups of variables fixed effects technique was used. 
Finally, all of the statistical analyses was conducted using SAS Version 9.2 ®. 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
The results chapter is organized into three sections. In section 4.1 shows National Drug 
utilization data trends of the raw data with the descriptive analysis at the substitutable level. 
In section 4.2 shows the National Generic index trends at the substitutable level. Finally, in 
section 4.3 shows the Regression results at the substitutable market. 
  4.1 National Drug utilization data trends of the raw data with 
descriptive analysis at the substitutable level.  
To understand how the results of this study were obtained, a flow diagram of the study was 
created, with a general explanation of how the databases are connecting and the main steps 
in this study. 
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4.1.1 All Drug Claim utilization data trends. 
 
During the time period that was analyzed (first quarter of 1991 until second quarter 2009) we 
see an increment in almost 100% on the population that Medicaid was covering and that also 
is what you observe in the numbers of claims (Rx) that were consumed, in the first quarter of 
1991 almost 42 millions of Rx were consumed and until the fourth quarter of 2005 were 160 
millions of Rx were consumed. 
 
January 2006 was the beginning of the Medicare Part-D program. As seen, a significant 
decline in the use of prescription occurred. As Medicaid Part-D began over 7 million dual-
eligible members moved from the Medicaid program to the Medicare program, producing a 
decline from 160 millions of Rx in the fourth quarter of 2005  to 93 million in the first quarter of 
2006.   
 80 
   
Also, we observe the same tendency in the amount of expenditure ($) that Medicaid program 
incurred in that period from $10,915,731,482 in the fourth quarter of 2005 to $6,299,469,907 
in the first quarter of 2006.  
 
Furthermore, even thought the charts numbers of claims (Rx) and expenditure ($) has 
different slop the proportion at the beginning of 2006 is the same on both, was appreciated 
that the cost per claims (Rx) from the beginning of 1991 until the first two quarters of 2009 is 
clear the sustained and steady increase in this, started in almost $20 per claims (Rx) and in 
this 18 years increase almost $80 but claims (Rx). 
During the process of creating the “analytic data set”, the start point was a set of 
7,294,505,589 drugs claim, but was observed that the data had Rx claims; Over-the-Counter 
(OTC) claims and a group of drugs claims with unknown product information, therefore, after 
worked in all of them (group of drugs claims with unknown product information) and check 
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case by case, the “group of drugs claims with unknown product information” was reduce to 
208,412 drugs claim. As a result, the final “analytic data set” was 7,294,297,177 drugs claim 
(that represent a 99.997% of the drugs claims used); where 7,021,539,129 were Rx claims 
and 272,758,049 OTC claims; below is the information mentioned before:  
 
Consequently, after the “analytic data set” was define the drugs claims were able to be 
separated by patent status for the purpose of the study and see how the 18 years of drugs 
claims was behave. 
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Now overall, in this 18 years the claims (Rx) price have increase in almost 300%, but if we 
separated the claims (Rx) by market status (Brand (SS); Off-Patent (IMS) & Generics (NMS)) 
we can observe how each of them have been increase across the period of time in different 
proportions.  
Therefore, the Single Source (SS) Brand Rx price is the one that shows the biggest increase 
from $36.12 in 1991 to $ 220.56 in 2009, during the 18 years period that were analyzed, but 
the exponential growth was between the years 2005 – 2009 where the price increase from 
$140.76 to $ 220.56 that represent almost a 56% increase in 4 years and if we compared 
with that during 1991 until 2005 (14 years) the price of Rx increase 290% and compared with 
the 18 years that were analyzed where the price per Rx increase from $36.12 to $ 220.56 
that represent almost 500% approximately. 
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Now, off-patent (IMS) brand Rx price shows the increase from $18.19 in 1991 to $181.98 in 
2009, during the 18 years period that were analyzed, but the exponential growth was 
between the years 2005 – 2009 where the price increase from $76.20 to $181.98 that 
represent almost a 139% increase in 4 years and if we compared with that during 1991 until 
2005 (14 years) the price of Rx increase 319% and compared with the 18 years that were 
analyzed where the price per Rx increase from $18.19 to $181.98 that represent almost 
900% approximately. 
Finally, Generic (NMS) Rx price shows the increase from $8.13 in 1991 to $21.47 in 2009, 
during the 18 years period that were analyzed that represent almost 164% approximately. 
More details in summary data were added in the appendix. 
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In general, we are able to see that in this 18 years of study, the incremental of cost and drug 
consumption have been substantial if we compare with cost of living and if you check each 
state.  For more details in each state was add in the appendix. 
 4.1.2 State Regulations 
The National Association of Board of Pharmacy (NABP) Survey of Pharmacy Law was the 
source from which we obtained an overview of the laws that regulate the prescribing and 
dispensing of medications and professional standards, however, represents just some of the 
laws that regulate the profession of pharmacy. For the purposes of this study, the information 
used was from 1991 to 2008 to obtain regulation information related to substitution and 
pharmacy and pharmacist legislation by state.  
The variables from “Survey of Pharmacy Law” were selected, re-coded and the result was six 
variables that represent the “Drug product selection”, these variables were: Generic formulary 
substitution (notation: Ph_GF); Orange Book or formulary base in Orange Book (notation: 
Ph_OB); Mandatory or Permissive (notation: Ph_Pm); How to prevent substitution (notation: 
Ph_Ps); Patient cost saving pass on (notation: Ph_ Cs); Patient Consent (notation: Ph_Pc). 
Another important part, is to be aware of how the graph were created, the way that them can 
be observe are in two: One , is by the length of the bars that by each State will be different 
and the second, is by how many of different colors each State has. In the first case, the 
length of the bars will represent how much strong is the possibility to do the substitution 
between brand medication to the generic; in the second case, is how many laws or 
regulations each State is using to prevent or accept the substitution between brand drug to 
generic. 
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Therefore, during the time frame of the study (since 1991 until 2008) States have not change 
drastically or dramatically there substitution law. If we analyzed the graph drug product 
selection provision by year, are we able to observe that the changes are not significant 
across the years, That means that States have been using the same regulations to prevent 
the use of generics in this period & just few of them have been incorporated more regulations 
to increase the restriction. Here we have two examples of the beginning of the period and 
almost the end of the period. 
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Now if we analyzed the same type of graph but by State the perception is different; we can 
separated these in four groups:  
1. States that did not have much variability but also the length (that represent how 
restricted they could be) were not high;  
These States are 7 (Washington, South Carolina, Oklahoma, New Jersey, Missouri, Indiana 
& Alabama); they represent a 14% of the total. (More details on each State see appendix) 
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Most of the States in this group does not have more than 3 different laws related with the 
substitution brand medication with generics and the variability between each year is almost 
constant, but in all of them, the strength of the laws it is not higher than 4 (been 11 the max.). 
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2. States that did not have much variability but also the length (that represent how 
restricted they could be) were high. 
These States are 8 (Florida, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, West Virginia & Wisconsin); they represent a 16% of the total. (More details on 
each State see appendix) 
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Most of the States in this group have between 4 and 6 different laws related with the 
substitution brand medication with generics and the variability between each year is almost 
constant, but in all of them, the strength of the laws it is high closer to 11 (most of them 
between 9 to 11)  (been 11 the max.). 
3. States that did not have much variability but also the length (that represent how 
restricted they could be) were intermediate;  
These States are 12 (Alabama, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Maine, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota & Utah ); They 
represent a 24% of the total. (more details on each State, see appendix) 
Most of the States in this group have between 3 and 5 different laws related with the 
substitution brand medication with generics and the variability between each year is almost 
constant, but in all of them, the strength of the laws it is between 6 to 8  (been 11 the max.). 
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4. States that had variability but also the length (that represent how restricted they could 
be) were high & low;  
These States are 23 (Rhode Island, Texas, Wyoming, Virginia, Vermont, Tennessee, 
Oregon, Ohio , Minnesota, Michigan, Maryland, Louisiana, Kentucky, Kansas, Iowa, Illinois, 
Idaho, Hawaii, Delaware, Colorado, California & Arkansas); They represent a 46% of the 
total. (More details on each State see appendix) 
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In most of the States in this group the variability between year is very high, because most of 
them between the period that was study and contrary to the other groups they change the 
number of the laws that they have; the number of laws that the States have is between 2 and 
6 different laws related with the substitution brand medication with generics. Finally, the 
variability between each year in this group is also high because has fluctuations, in all of 
them, the strength of the laws it is between 3 to 10 (been 11 the max.). 
 
4.2 Generic rates trends at the substitutable level.  
 
One of the main objective of this study, was create and calculate an instrument that has able 
to measure the consumption of generics medication, base on the market status of each of 
product across the time. 
Consequently, three different rates were created: 
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1. Net Generic Rate (% of All Dispensed as Generic): Non-Innovator Multi-Source / 
(Single Source + Innovator Multi-Source + Non-Innovator Multi-Source). 
2. Generic Prescribing Rate (% of Off-Patent Dispensed as a Generic): (Innovator Multi-
Source + Non-Innovator Multi-Source) / (Single Source + Innovator Multi-Source + 
Non-Innovator Multi-Source). 
3. Generic Dispensing Rate (% All Prescribed as Off-Patent): Non-Innovator Multi-
Source / (Innovator Multi-Source + Non-Innovator Multi-Source). 
 
These three instruments, were able to capture if a medication in a specific therapeutic class 
was a single source or off-patent or has generics alternatives, therefore could be substitute if 
the case was appropriate. Also, were measure by the number of prescriptions (Rx) that were 
used and by the amount of money reimbursed ($) in Medicaid program between 1991 until 
2008, 
The sample that was used in this study was the complete population of drugs that Medicaid 
program reimbursement between 1991 until 2008; the population of drugs was a diverse 
group of eighteen different therapeutic Class where in almost all of them we found brand 
medications, generic medications and over-the-counter (OTC) medications; but for the 
purpose of this study over-the-counter (OTC) drugs will be included in the descriptive 
analysis but not in the statistical. The main reason that over-the-counter (OTC) drugs were 
excluded from the statistical analysis was because between 1991 until 2008 there were many 
federal changes (related to OTC regulation) and too much variability across states; therefore 
we were not able to capture that effect.  
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4.2.1 Generic rates based on Expenditures ($) at the 
substitutable level.  
 
Nationwide we observed after Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR) measure by reimbursement 
($) was calculate, the percentage of off-patent medication dispensing as a generic increased 
36.81% in 18 years from 50.8% in 1991 to 69.5% in 2009; but the biggest percentage in 
these 18 years was in 2006 were the 82.6% of off-patent medication was dispensing as a 
generic, therefore in the first 15 years the increment was in 62.6%; then after the last 3 years, 
the percentage of off-patent medication that was dispensing as a generic decrease in 15.9%. 
Now, after Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) measure by reimbursement ($) was calculate, the 
percentage of all prescribed as off-patent medication decrease in 30.75% in 18 years from 
38.7% in 1991 to 26.8% in 2009; but again, the biggest decreased in percentage in these 18 
years was in 2001 were the 20.7% of all medications prescribed as off-patent medication;  
therefore in the first 10 years the decreased was in 46.51%, but  after the last 8 years the 
percentage of all prescribed as off-patent medication increase again in 29.47%. 
Finally, after Net Generic Rate (NGR) measure by reimbursement ($) was calculate, the 
percentage of all dispensed as generic medication decrease in 5.076% in 18 years from 
19.7% in 1991 to 18.7% in 2009; but again, the biggest increased in percentage in these 18 
years was in 1995 were the 23.1% of all dispensed as generic medication, therefore in the 
first 5 years the increased was in 17.26%, but  after the last 14 years the percentage of all 
dispensed as generic decreased again in 19.048%. 
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4.2.2 Generic index based Prescription (Rx) at the 
substitutable level.  
 
On a national scale, once Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR) measure by prescription 
(Rx) was calculate, the percentage of off-patent medication dispensing as a generic 
increased 37.43% in 18 years from 69.2% in 1991 to 95.1% in 2009; with a very smooth and 
almost constant slope.  At the same time, when Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) by 
prescription (Rx) was calculate, the percentage of all prescribed as off-patent medication 
increase in 9.84% in 18 years from 67.1% in 1991 to 73.7% in 2009; Now, during that period, 
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between 1998 until 2005 Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) by prescription (Rx) decrease 
9.45% from 1998 until 2001 and then increase 12.23% until 2005. Therefore, just in the last 4 
years the percentage of all prescribed as off-patent medication increase again in 18.11%. 
Finally, Net Generic Rate (NGR) measure by prescription (Rx) was calculate and the 
percentage of all dispensed as generic medication increase in 51.08% in 18 years from 
46.4% in 1991 to 70.1% in 2009; but again, during that period, between 1998 until 2005 Net 
Generic Rate (NGR) measure by prescription (Rx) decrease 8.99% from 1998 until 2001 and 
then increase 21.43% until 2005. Therefore, just in the last 4 years the percentage of all 
prescribed as off-patent medication increase again in 21.28%. 
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4.3 Regression results at the substitutable market. 
 
One of objectives of this study was determine and calculate the impact of state 
regulation, related to generic substitution drugs. Therefore, a panel procedure call “the Two 
Way Fixed effects” was accomplished for the three different rates, nationally and by 
therapeutic class. 
4.3.1 Regression analysis at the substitutable market level for Net Generic 
Rate (NGR); Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) & Generic Dispensing Rate 
(GDR) for U.S. Medicaid by Prescription (Claims). 
 
At the national level, nineteen regulations from two different data sources were analyzed by 
prescription (claims); to determine the effects of State regulation on the substitution process (Table.I). 
These two different data sources are survey pharmacy law (where was selected twelve regulations that 
physicians can use to prevent generic substitution) and Medicaid reimbursement (where was selected 
seven regulations that affect the discount price and the dispensing fee by type of medication).   
As a result, overall regulations that have direct effect from Physicians in the process of 
prescribing and substituted a medication for the generic if that is available, has negative or none effects 
nationally across the time (Table.II), these effects are when all drugs are dispensed as a generic, when 
Off-Patent drugs are dispensed as a generic and when all drugs are prescribed as Off-Patent drugs.  
The group of regulations that affect discount price and dispensing fee in a pharmacy have an 
effect in the process of dispensing and prescribing a medication; this is how, a percentage discount for 
Generic Rx and Dispensing Fee for Unit Dose Rx has a positive effects, as a result change in 1% AWP 
Discount or in $1 Dispensing Fee will increase the process of drug product selection. But also, some of 
these effects are negative, this is how, a percentage discount for Baseline Rx and dispensing Fee for 
Generic Rx has a negative effects in these two process; therefore a change in 1% AWP Discount or in 
$1 Dispensing Fee will decrease the process of drug product selection. 
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Table II. Net Generic Rate (NGR); Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) & Generic 
Dispensing Rate (GDR) U.S. Medicaid measure by Prescription (Claims)  
National Generic Rates by Prescriptions (RX)
Unit of Analysis: State & Time
Measure: Prescriptions (RX)
Dependent Variable: GPR ,  GDR & NGR
Data: Survey Pharmacy Law & Medicaid Reimbursement
Fit Statistics
Variables Names Estimate Pr > |t Estimate Pr > |t Estimate Pr > |t
Intersection 0.743 <.0001 0.768 <.0001 0.978 <.0001
Formulary Based on Positive List -0.042 <.0001 -0.035 <.0001 -0.016 0.0031
No Formulary Specified as Basis -0.034 <.0001 -0.024 <.0001 -0.022 <.0001
Based Only on Prescriber Permission -0.044 <.0001 -0.034 <.0001 -0.024 0.0003
Formulary Based on Others list 0.004 0.5196 0.000 0.9426 0.008 0.1646
Formulary Based on Orange Book -0.006 0.0416 -0.004 0.0559 -0.002 0.3574
Generic Substitution is Mandatory -0.011 0.0071 -0.004 0.2022 -0.014 0.0003
Substitution Prevented by Check Box -0.010 0.0183 -0.020 <.0001 0.011 0.005
Substitution Prevented by Initials of the Phrase -0.005 0.2366 -0.015 <.0001 0.012 0.001
Substitution Prevented by Written Phrase 0.002 0.6402 -0.014 <.0001 0.020 <.0001
Pass On Part of Cost Savings -0.017 0.0004 -0.014 <.0001 -0.004 0.3492
Pass On Full Cost Savings -0.004 0.4399 -0.010 0.0251 0.004 0.4951
Patient Consent or Notification Required -0.014 <.0001 -0.011 <.0001 -0.008 0.0007
Variables Names Estimate Pr > |t Estimate Pr > |t Estimate Pr > |t
AWP % Discount for Baseline Rx -0.300 <.0001 -0.256 <.0001 -0.085 0.0342
AWP % Discount for Generic Rx 0.133 <.0001 0.091 <.0001 0.067 <.0001
AWP % Discount by Channel Distribution 0.005 0.3316 0.014 0.0007 -0.010 0.0352
Dispensing Fee for Basic Rx 0.005 0.0121 0.006 <.0001 -0.002 0.3594
Dispensing Fee for Generic Rx -0.008 <.0001 -0.005 0.0002 -0.006 0.0005
Dispensing Fee for Institutional Rx 0.000 0.4245 0.000 0.7289 0.001 0.1546
Dispensing Fee for Unit Dose Rx 0.003 <.0001 0.002 0.0036 0.002 0.0006
National
NGR_RX_USA  GPR_RX_USA GDR_RX_USA
R-Square 90.64%
EstimateEstimate
91.66%
Estimate
89.33%
 
4.3.2 Regression analysis at the substitutable market level for Net Generic 
Rate (NGR); Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) & Generic Dispensing Rate 
(GDR) for U.S. Medicaid by Expenditures ($). 
At the national level, nineteen regulations from two different data sources were analyzed by 
expenditures ($); to determine the effects of State regulation on the substitution process (Table.I)  As a 
result, overall regulations that have direct effect from Physicians in the process of prescribing and 
substituted a medication for the generic if that is available, has negative or none effects nationally 
across the time when all drugs are dispensed as a generic & when Off-Patent drugs are dispensed as a 
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generic (Table.III). When all drugs are prescribed as Off-Patent drugs few regulations have negative 
effects (Table.III).  
Finally, Medicaid reimbursement regulations that affect discount price and dispensing fee in a 
pharmacy have an effect in the process of dispensing and prescribing a medication; this is how, an 
AWP percentage discount has negative and positive effects depending on the process of dispensing or 
prescribing (Table.III). But also, the effect of dispensing fee has negative and positive effects depending 
on the process of dispensing or prescribing (Table.III) 
Table III. Net Generic Rate (NGR); Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) & Generic 
Dispensing Rate (GDR) U.S. Medicaid measure by Expenditures ($) 
National Generic Rates by Reimbursement ($)
Unit of Analysis: State & Time
Measure: Reimbursement ($)
Dependent Variable: GPR ,  GDR & NGR
Data: Survey Pharmacy Law & Medicaid Reimbursement
Fit Statistics
Variables Names Estimate Pr > |t Estimate Pr > |t Estimate Pr > |t
Intersection 0.204 <.0001 0.257 <.0001 0.811 <.0001
Formulary Based on Positive List -0.012 0.029 -0.011 0.0655 -0.004 0.7209
No Formulary Specified as Basis -0.015 <.0001 -0.009 0.0254 -0.027 0.0006
Based Only on Prescriber Permission 0.040 <.0001 0.045 <.0001 0.012 0.3491
Formulary Based on Others list 0.022 <.0001 0.018 0.0016 0.044 <.0001
Formulary Based on Orange Book -0.004 0.1312 -0.003 0.3533 -0.003 0.5085
Generic Substitution is Mandatory -0.011 0.0041 -0.004 0.3672 -0.029 0.0001
Substitution Prevented by Check Box -0.018 <.0001 -0.027 <.0001 0.000 0.9892
Substitution Prevented by Initials of the Phrase -0.016 <.0001 -0.023 <.0001 -0.007 0.2957
Substitution Prevented by Written Phrase -0.010 0.001 -0.025 <.0001 0.016 0.0059
Pass On Part of Cost Savings -0.006 0.142 -0.003 0.5681 -0.019 0.0221
Pass On Full Cost Savings -0.007 0.16 -0.005 0.4221 -0.015 0.1526
Patient Consent or Notification Required -0.003 0.2162 0.000 0.9022 -0.007 0.1299
Variables Names Estimate Pr > |t Estimate Pr > |t Estimate Pr > |t
AWP % Discount for Baseline Rx -0.179 <.0001 -0.126 0.0029 -0.360 <.0001
AWP % Discount for Generic Rx 0.026 0.0609 -0.022 0.132 0.184 <.0001
AWP % Discount by Channel Distribution 0.028 <.0001 0.030 <.0001 0.024 0.0101
Dispensing Fee for Basic Rx 0.006 0.0023 0.007 0.0003 0.005 0.2014
Dispensing Fee for Generic Rx -0.009 <.0001 -0.004 0.0091 -0.023 <.0001
Dispensing Fee for Institutional Rx 0.001 0.1646 0.001 0.0777 0.000 0.7265
Dispensing Fee for Unit Dose Rx 0.005 <.0001 0.003 <.0001 0.008 <.0001
R-Square 95.46% 96.08% 82.38%
National
NGR_$_USA GPR_$_USA GDR_$_USA
Estimate Estimate Estimate
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main objective of the study was to understand how the regulations intended to 
influence Generic Substitution and affect and influence on drug product selection. 
5.1 Net Generic Rate (NGR) 
5.1.1 Net Generic Rate (NGR) measure by prescription (Rx) 
First was analyzed the percentage of All drugs that were dispensed as a generic 
defined as a Net Generic rate (NGR). As a result, nationally, a positive formulary and non-
formulary is significant in the process of drug product selection. However, both of them 
decrease the percentage of drugs that are dispensed as a generic if the states have them in 
their regulations when they are significant. A positive formulary is, a list of generic drug 
products from different manufacturers identifies as products that may be substituted for one 
another, and most states specify the Orange Book as the positive formulary; and a non-
formulary means that the drugs are not included in a preferred medications list for 
pharmacists to be selected. After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a 
positive formulary regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 12 
therapeutic categories and in 5 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 15.21 
percentage points in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the 
minimum decrease will be 2.86 percentage points in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” therapeutic 
category.  
A non-formulary regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant 
in 13 therapeutic categories and in 4 of them not; that maximum decrease will be 11.33 
percentage points in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the 
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minimum decrease will be 1.34 percentage points in “Neuromuscular Drugs” therapeutic 
category.  
Different Types of Formularies are not the only drug products selection list that states 
have or used to help to control the cost of prescription and the process of generic 
substitution; therefore, Others list was another of the regulations that was selected to be part 
of this study and is not significant when is measure by prescription (Rx). After the seventeen 
therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Others list” regulation showed that, measure by 
prescription (Rx) was significant in 10 therapeutic category and in 7 of them not; and that the 
maximum decrease will be 5.81 percentage point in “Anti-Infective” therapeutic category and 
the increase will be 13.43 percentage point in “Stimulants/Anti-Obesity/Anorexia” therapeutic 
category.  
The used of the Approved Drug Product book, commonly known as the “Orange 
Book” in the state regulation is significant and decreases the processes of drug product 
selection when is measure by prescription (Rx). The Approved Drug Products book with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (the List, commonly known as the Orange Book) 
identifies drug products approved on the basis of safety and effectiveness by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).  After 
the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an Orange Book regulation showed that, 
measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 9 therapeutic categories and in 8 of them not; 
and that the maximum decrease will be 8.32 percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic 
category and the increase will be 1.92 percentage points in “Neuromuscular Drugs” 
therapeutic category.  
Drug product selection law, vary significantly among states. Therefore, in states 
where pharmacists must substitute a less expensive generic drug, also called “mandatory” 
substitution regulation; is significant when measure by prescription (Rx) was, but decreases 
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the processes of drug product selection. In the same way, Patient Consent regulations, 
determines whether patients can influence the generic substitution process at the point of the 
pharmacy, and that decreases the processes of drug product selection or “generic 
substitution”. After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a “Permissive or 
Mandatory” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 12 
therapeutic categories and in 5 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 11.28 
percentage points in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the 
increase will be 3.47 percentage points in “Nutritional Products” therapeutic category.  
During the process of drug product selection, there are a lot of ways to prevent 
substitution in a prescription by physicians. One of them, is when a prescriber writes with 
words “Dispensing as Written”, “No substitution” or an equivalent notation that prevent a 
pharmacist substitute the prescription. Another instance is when prescribers write the initials 
for example: “DAW” or “NS”, etc. The final alternative; is when prescriber must check a box 
on a prescription where is labeled, like example: “Dispensing as Written” or “Generic 
equivalent Allowed". In our study, the three alternatives: the Check Box, Initials and Written in 
Words, influenced in a reduction of the product selection drug process, and in the case of the 
measure by prescription (Rx) just "Check Box" was significant.  
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a “Check Box” regulation 
showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 12 therapeutic categories and in 
5 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 5.87 percentage point in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the minimum decrease will be 
5.6345 percentage points in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” therapeutic category. Afterwards, 
“Initials” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 12 
therapeutic category and in 5 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 10.79 
percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the 
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increase will be 5.43 percentage point in “Genitourinary” therapeutic category. Finally, 
“Written in Words” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 10 
therapeutic categories and in 7 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 4.11 
percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the 
increase will be 5.11 percentage point in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” therapeutic category. 
A cost savings pass-on was defined as a regulation that requires the pharmacist to 
pass-on to the consumer all or part of the cost savings from dispensing a non-innovator multi-
source drug. This regulation was separated in two: Patients Cost Saving by Portion of cost 
and Patients Cost Saving by Full saving, but only Patients Cost Saving by Portion of cost is 
significant and decreases the processes of drug product selection when is measure by 
prescription (Rx).  
Subsequently, “Patients Cost Saving by Portion of cost” regulation showed that, 
measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 7 therapeutic categories and in 10 of them 
not; and that the maximum decrease will be 5.25 percentage points in “Antineoplastics” 
therapeutic category and the increase will be 5.28 percentage points in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category. Then, a “Patients Cost Saving by Full 
saving” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 12 
therapeutic category and in 5 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 7.58 
percentage point in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” therapeutic category and the increase will be 
11.08 percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category.  
Another regulation that was significant only when was measure by prescription (Rx) 
and decreases the processes of drug product selection was “Patient Consent”.  Patient 
Consent was defined as the requirement that a patient’s permission is necessary to substitute 
or that the patient has to be notified/informed of the substitution of his/her medication. Then, 
after the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a “Patient Consent” regulation 
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showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 13 therapeutic categories and in 
4 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 7.49 percentage points in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 2.32 
percentage points in “Nutritional Products” therapeutic category. 
Furthermore, another regulation that affects the process of generic substitution in a 
pharmacy and could increasing or decreasing Pharmacy Profit is the Average Wholesale 
Price (AWP) discount. This discount is defined as an amount payable by pharmacies for the 
cost of a prescription expressed as a percentage off of Average Wholesale Price (AWP). 
Therefore, measure by prescription (Rx) in an “AWP Basic Discount”, the bigger discount that 
manufacturers offered to a pharmacy, the pharmacy would receive a lower payment, as 
result, would decrease the processes of drug product selection. In the other hand, in an 
“AWP Generic Discount”, the bigger discount that manufacturers offered to a pharmacy, the 
pharmacy would receive higher payment, as a result, would increase the processes of drug 
product selection. Then, after the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “AWP 
Basic Discount” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 13 
therapeutic category and in 4 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.012 % in 
“Anti-Infective” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection States change 
in 1% AWP Basic Discount and the increase will be 0.016 % in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & 
Neurology” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection States change in 
1% AWP Basic Discount.  
A “AWP Generic Discount” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was 
significant in 12 therapeutic category and in 5 of them not; and that the maximum decrease 
will be 0.005 % in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if in the 
process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP Generic Discount and the 
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increase will be 0.0029 % in “Hematological” therapeutic category if in the process of drug 
product selection States change in 1% AWP Generic Discount.  
Finally, a “AWP by Channel of Distribution” regulation showed that, measure by 
prescription (Rx) was significant in 14 therapeutic category and in 3 of them not; and that the 
maximum decrease will be 0.001 % in “Neuromuscular Drugs” therapeutic category if in the 
process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP by Channel of Distribution and 
the increase will be 0.0014 % in “Biological” therapeutic category if in the process of drug 
product selection States change in 1% AWP by Channel of Distribution.  
We have regulations that affect directly to the process of drug product selection by 
increasing or decreasing Pharmacy Profit. Is the case with, Dispensing Fee in pharmacy, 
which is an amount of money pay to a pharmacy for dispensed a prescription, as a result, the 
pharmacy receives a fixed payment (reimbursement) for the transaction. In this study, three 
type of the dispensing fee were significant measure by prescription (Rx): the base rate, unit 
dose and generic but the dispensing fee by institution was not significant. The first two, the 
base rate & unit dose shows that, they increase the processes of drug product selection but 
in the case of dispensing fee on generic if the state has in the regulation, will decrease generic 
substitution. 
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Dispensing Fee Base 
Rate” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 13 therapeutic 
category and in 4 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 4.57 percentage point 
in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if In the process of drug 
product selection States that change in $1 the Basic Dispensing Fee and the increase will be 
2.11 percentage point in “Respiratory” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product 
selection States that change in $1 the Basic Dispensing Fee. 
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A “Dispensing Fee on Generic” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) 
was significant in 9 therapeutic category and in 8 of them not; and that the maximum 
decrease will be 2.57 percentage point in “Respiratory” therapeutic category if In the process 
of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Dispensing Fee on Generic and the 
increase will be 1.8089 percentage point in “Antineoplastics” therapeutic category if In the 
process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Dispensing Fee on Generic.  
Then, even thought “Institutional Dispensing Fee” was not significant nationally by 
therapeutic category was different, therefore after the seventeen therapeutic categories were 
analyze, an “Institutional Dispensing Fee” regulation showed that, measure by prescription 
(Rx) was significant in 7 therapeutic category and in 10 of them not; and that the maximum 
decrease will be 0.69 percentage point in “Miscellaneous Products” therapeutic category if In 
the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Institutional Dispensing 
Fee and the increase will be 0.76 percentage point in “Hematological” therapeutic category if 
In the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Institutional Dispensing 
Fee.  
Finally, “Unit Dose Dispensing Fee” regulation showed that, measure by prescription 
(Rx) was significant in 9 therapeutic category and in 8 of them not; and that the maximum 
decrease will be 0.47 percentage point in “Central Nervous System” therapeutic category if In 
the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Unit Dose Dispensing Fee 
and the increase will be 1.88 percentage point in “Miscellaneous Products” therapeutic 
category if In the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Unit Dose 
Dispensing Fee.  
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5.1.2 Net Generic Rate (NGR) measure by Reimbursement ($) 
 
Net Generic rate (NGR) measure by reimbursement ($) was defined and analyzed as 
a percentage of All drugs that were dispensed as a generic. As a result, nationally, a positive 
formulary and non-formulary is significant in the process of drug product selection; but, both 
of them decrease the percentage of drugs that are dispensed as a generic if the states have 
them in their regulations when they are significant. As be previous explained, a positive 
formulary is, a list of generic drug products from different manufacturers identifies as products 
that may be substituted for one another, and most states specify the Orange Book as the 
positive formulary; and a non-formulary means that the drugs are not included in a preferred 
medications list for pharmacists to be selected. After the seventeen therapeutic category 
were analyze, a positive formulary regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) 
showed that, in 9 therapeutic category were significant and in 8 of them not; where the 
maximum decrease will be 16.61 percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” 
therapeutic category and the increase will be 6.74 percentage point in “Antineoplastics”  
therapeutic category. In the same way, a non-formulary regulation showed that, measure by 
reimbursement ($) showed that, in 6 therapeutic category were significant and in 11 of them 
not; where the maximum decrease will be 11.68 percentage point in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the minimum decrease will be 2.09 
percentage point in “Hematological”  therapeutic category. 
Others list was another of the regulations that was selected to be part of this study 
and is significant and increase the process of drug product selection when was measure by 
reimbursement ($). After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Others list” 
regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 11 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 6 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 2.76 
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percentage point in “Anti-Infective” therapeutic category and the increase will be 8.27 
percentage point in “Stimulants/Anti-Obesity/Anorexia” therapeutic category.  
The used of the Approved Drug Product book, commonly known as the “Orange 
Book” in the state regulation is not significant when was measure by reimbursement ($). An 
Orange Book regulation measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 4 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 13 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 12.81 
percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic category and a minimum decrease will be 3.17 
percentage point in “Gastrointestinal”  therapeutic category. 
Drug product selection law, vary significantly among states. In states where 
pharmacists must substitute a less expensive generic drug, also called “mandatory” 
substitution regulation; is significant when was measure by reimbursement ($) but decreases 
the processes of drug product selection. Then, a “Permissive or Mandatory” regulation 
measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 9 therapeutic category were significant and in 
8 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 9.71 percentage point in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 4.51 
percentage point in “Miscellaneous Products” therapeutic category.  
On the other hand, during the process of drug product selection, there are a lot of 
ways to prevent substitution in a prescription by physicians. One of them, is when a 
prescriber writes with words “Dispensing as Written”, “No substitution” or an equivalent 
notation that prevent a pharmacist substitute the prescription. Another instance is when 
prescribers write the initials for example: “DAW” or “NS”, etc. The final alternative; is when 
prescriber must check a box on a prescription where is labeled, like example: “Dispensing as 
Written” or “Generic equivalent Allowed". These three alternatives: the Check Box, Initials 
and Written in Words, influenced in a reduction in product selection drug process and were 
significant when measured by the reimbursement ($). 
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After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a “Check Box” regulation 
measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 9 therapeutic category were significant and in 
8 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 9.83 percentage point in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 5.22 
percentage point in “Genitourinary” therapeutic category. Afterwards, an “Initials” regulation 
measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 10 therapeutic category were significant and 
in 7 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 7.31 percentage point in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 5.89 
percentage point in “Genitourinary” therapeutic category. Finally, “Written in Words” 
regulation measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 10 therapeutic category were 
significant and in 7 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 6.46 percentage point 
in “Biological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 6.301 percentage point in 
“Genitourinary” therapeutic category. 
A cost savings pass-on was defined as a regulation that requires the pharmacist to 
pass-on to the consumer all or part of the cost savings from dispensing a non-innovator multi-
source drug and was separated in two: Patients Cost Saving by Portion of cost and Patients 
Cost Saving by Full saving, but was not significant when was measure by reimbursement ($). 
But, after the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Patients Cost Saving by 
Portion of cost” regulation measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 7 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 10 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 4.82 
percentage point in “Gastrointestinal” therapeutic category and the increase will be 10.09 
percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category. In the case 
of a “Patients Cost Saving by Full saving” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement 
($) showed that, in 10 therapeutic category were significant and in 7 of them not; where the 
maximum decrease will be 11.08 percentage point in “Anti-Infective” therapeutic category and 
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the increase will be 7.02 percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” 
therapeutic category.  
Patient Consent was a regulation that was not significant when measure by 
reimbursement ($) was. After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a “Patient 
Consent” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) in 10 therapeutic category 
were significant and in 7 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 4.26 percentage 
point in “Biological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 2.81 percentage point in 
“Nutritional Products” therapeutic category.  
Another regulation that affects the process of generic substitution in a pharmacy and 
could increasing or decreasing Pharmacy Profit is the Average Wholesale Price (AWP) 
discount. Therefore, the results shows that, measure by reimbursement ($) in an “AWP Basic 
Discount”, the bigger discount that manufacturers offered to a pharmacy, the pharmacy would 
receive a lower payment, as result, would decrease the processes of drug product selection. 
In the other hand, in an “AWP Generic Discount”, will not be significant, and in an “AWP by 
Channel of Distribution” the bigger discount that manufacturers offered to a pharmacy, the 
pharmacy would receive higher payment, as a result, would increase the processes of drug 
product selection 
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “AWP Basic Discount” 
regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($)in 10 therapeutic category were 
significant and in 7 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.011 % in “Anti-
Infective” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection States change in 1% 
AWP Basic Discount and the increase will be 0.01 % in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & 
Neurology” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection States change in 
1% AWP Basic Discount. After that, an “AWP Generic Discount” regulation measure by 
reimbursement ($) showed that, in 8 therapeutic category were significant and in 9 of them 
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not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.004 % in “Stimulants/Anti-Obesity/Anorexia” 
therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP 
Generic Discount and the increase will be 0.003 % in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” therapeutic 
category if in the process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP Generic 
Discount. Finally, an “AWP by Channel of Distribution” regulation measure by reimbursement 
($) showed that, in 12 therapeutic category were significant and in 5 of them not; and that the 
maximum decrease will be 0.0005 % in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic 
category if in the process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP by Channel of 
Distribution and the increase will be 0.0012 % in “Biological” therapeutic category if in the 
process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP by Channel of Distribution. 
Finally, we have regulations that affect directly to the process of drug product 
selection by increasing or decreasing Pharmacy Profit. Is the case with, Dispensing Fee in 
pharmacy, which is an amount of money pay to a pharmacy for dispensed a prescription, as 
a result, the pharmacy receives a fixed payment (reimbursement) for the transaction. In this 
study, three type of the dispensing fee were significant measure by reimbursement ($): the 
base rate, unit dose and generic but the dispensing fee by institution was not significant. The 
first two, the base rate & unit dose shows that, they increase the processes of drug product 
selection but in the case of dispensing fee on generic if the state has in the regulation, will 
decrease generic substitution. 
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Dispensing Fee Base 
Rate” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 9 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 8 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 3.92 
percentage point in “Nutritional Products” therapeutic category if In the process of drug 
product selection States that change in $1 the Basic Dispensing Fee and the increase will be 
1.78 percentage point in “Antineoplastics” therapeutic category if In the process of drug 
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product selection States that change in $1 the Basic Dispensing Fee. After that, an 
“Dispensing Fee on Generic” regulation measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 8 
therapeutic category were significant and in 9 of them not; and that the maximum decrease 
will be 2.07 percentage point in “Respiratory” therapeutic category if In the process of drug 
product selection States that change in $1 the Dispensing Fee on Generic and the increase 
will be 1.68 percentage point in “Genitourinary” therapeutic category if In the process of drug 
product selection States that change in $1 the Dispensing Fee on Generic. 
Then, even thought “Institutional Dispensing Fee” was not significant nationally by 
therapeutic category was different, therefore an “Institutional Dispensing Fee” regulation 
measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 6 therapeutic category were significant and in 
11 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.47 percentage point in 
“Genitourinary” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that 
change in $1 the Institutional Dispensing Fee and the increase will be 0.94 percentage point 
in “Biological” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that 
change in $1 the Institutional Dispensing Fee. 
Finally, an “Unit Dose Dispensing Fee” regulation showed that, measure by 
reimbursement ($) showed that, in 9 therapeutic category were significant and in 8 of them 
not; and that the minimum increase will be 0.38 percentage point in “Analgesics & 
Anesthetics” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that 
change in $1 the Unit dose Dispensing Fee and the maximum increase will be 2.29 
percentage point in “Nutritional Products” therapeutic category if In the process of drug 
product selection States that change in $1 the Unit Dose Dispensing Fee. 
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5.2  Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) 
5.2.1 Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) measure by Prescription 
(Rx) 
The next rate calculated and analyzed was the percentage of all prescribed as off-
patent drugs and was defining as a Generic Prescribing rate (GPR) measure by prescription 
(Rx). As a result, nationally, a positive formulary or non-formulary is significant in the process 
of drug product selection measure by prescription (Rx) but , they decrease the percentage of 
all prescribed as off-patent drugs if the state have them in their regulations.  
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a positive formulary 
regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 13 therapeutic 
categories and in 4 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 14.60 percentage 
points in “Biological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 3.41 percentage points in 
“Stimulants/Anti-Obesity/Anorexia” therapeutic category. And a non-formulary regulation 
showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 12 therapeutic category and in 5 
of them not;  that maximum decrease will be 8.71 percentage point in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 1.70 
percentage point in “Nutritional Products”  therapeutic category.  
As we mentioned in the Net Generic Rate, formularies are not the only drug products 
selection list; therefore, Others list was another of the regulations that was selected to be part 
of this study but is not significant when is measure by prescription (Rx). Then After the 
seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Others list” regulation showed that, 
measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 8 therapeutic category and in 9 of them not; 
and that the maximum decrease will be 5.45 percentage point in “Anti-Infective” therapeutic 
category and the increase will be 22.99 percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic category.  
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The used of the Approved Drug Product book, commonly known as the “Orange 
Book” in the state regulation is not significant when measure by is.  After the seventeen 
therapeutic category were analyze, an Orange Book regulation measure by reimbursement 
($) showed that, in 9 therapeutic category were significant and in 8 of them not; where the 
maximum decrease will be 4.42 percentage point in “Stimulants/Anti-Obesity/Anorexia” 
therapeutic category and the increase will be 6.11 percentage point in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category. 
Drug product selection law, vary significantly among states; as a result, in states 
where pharmacists must substitute a less expensive generic drug, also called “mandatory” 
substitution regulation; is not significant when was measure prescription (Rx). 
As a consequence, After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Permissive 
or Mandatory” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 12 
therapeutic category and in 5 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 3.75 
percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the 
increase will be 5.44 percentage point in “Hematological” therapeutic category.  
Furthermore, as was previously mentioned, there are ways to prevent substitution in 
a prescription by prescribers. One of them is when a prescriber written in words “Dispensing 
as Written”, “No substitution” or an equivalent message that prevent a pharmacist to 
substitute the prescription. Another example is when prescriber writes the Initials for example: 
“DAW” or “NS”. Finally, is when prescriber must check a box on a prescription where is 
labeled like for example: “Dispensing as Written” or “Generic equivalent Allowed". In our 
study once again, the three of the alternatives that were mention before, were significant: the 
Check Box, Initials & Written in Words but all of them result in decrease the processes of 
drug product selection when were measure by prescription (Rx). 
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After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a “Check Box” regulation 
showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 11 therapeutic categories and in 
6 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 14.89 percentage point in “Biological” 
therapeutic category and the increase will be 4.61 percentage points in “Analgesics & 
Anesthetics” therapeutic category. Afterwards, an “Initials” regulation showed that, measure 
by prescription (Rx) was significant in 12 therapeutic category and in 5 of them not; and that 
the maximum decrease will be 10.67 percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & 
Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 3.77 percentage point in 
“Gastrointestinal” therapeutic category. Finally, “Written in Words” regulation showed that, 
measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 10 therapeutic categories and in 7 of them 
not; and that the maximum decrease will be 9.77 percentage points in “Biological” therapeutic 
category and the increase will be 3.01 percentage points in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” 
therapeutic category.  
A cost savings pass-on as was mention before was defined as a regulation that 
requires the pharmacist to pass-on to the consumer all or part of the cost savings from 
dispensing a non-innovator multi-source drug and was separated in two: Patients Cost 
Saving by Portion of cost and Patients Cost Saving by Full saving, but both Patients Cost 
Saving are significant and decreases the processes of drug product selection when is 
measure by prescription (Rx). Then, after the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, 
an “Patients Cost Saving by Portion of cost” regulation showed that, measure by prescription 
(Rx) was significant in 6 therapeutic category and in 11 of them not; and that the maximum 
decrease will be 4.36 percentage point in “Nutritional Products” therapeutic category and the 
minimum decrease will be 1.99 percentage point in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” therapeutic 
category. And, a “Patients Cost Saving by Full saving” regulation showed that, measure by 
prescription (Rx) was significant in 8 therapeutic category and in 9 of them not; and that the 
maximum decrease will be 6.50 percentage point in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” therapeutic 
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category and the increase will be 15.52 percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & 
Neurology” therapeutic category.  
Afterward, for the percentage of all prescribed as off-patent drugs, in states that 
determines whether patients can influence the generic substitution process at the point of the 
pharmacy, Patient Consent regulation was significant only when was measure by prescription 
(Rx) but decreases the processes of drug product selection or “generic substitution”. Then, 
after the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a “Patient Consent” regulation 
showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 10 therapeutic categories and in 
7 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 7.28 percentage points in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 1.04 
percentage points in “Neuromuscular Drugs” therapeutic category.  
For the Generic Prescribing Rate, another regulation that affects Pharmacy Profit 
was the Average Wholesale Price discount. Therefore, measure by prescription (Rx) the 
three AWP discount are significant. In “AWP Basic Discount”, the bigger discount that 
manufacturers offered to a pharmacy, the pharmacy would receive a lower payment, as 
result, would decrease the processes of drug product selection. In the other hand, in “AWP 
Generic Discount” & “AWP by Channel of Distribution” the bigger discount that manufacturers 
offered to a pharmacy, the pharmacy would receive higher payment, as a result, would 
increase the processes of drug product selection.   
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, “AWP Basic Discount” 
regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 10 therapeutic 
category and in 7 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.011 % in “Anti-
Infective” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection States change in 1% 
AWP Basic Discount and the increase will be 0.014 % in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & 
Neurology” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection States change in 
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1% AWP Basic Discount. After that,  “AWP Generic Discount” regulation showed that, 
measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 11 therapeutic category and in 6 of them not; 
and that the maximum decrease will be 0.005 % in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” 
therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP 
Generic Discount and the increase will be 0.002 % in “Cardiovascular” therapeutic category if 
in the process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP Generic Discount. Finally, 
“AWP by Channel of Distribution” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was 
significant in 12 therapeutic category and in 5 of them not; and that the maximum decrease 
will be 0.001 % in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if in the 
process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP by Channel of Distribution and 
the increase will be 0.001 % in “Biological” therapeutic category if in the process of drug 
product selection States change in 1% AWP by Channel of Distribution. 
As was mentioned before, some regulations affect directly to the Pharmacy Profit. Is 
the case with, Dispensing Fee in pharmacy, which is an amount of money pay to a pharmacy 
for dispensed a prescription, as a result, the pharmacy receives a fixed payment 
(reimbursement) for the transaction. In the study, three type of the dispensing were significant 
measure by prescription (Rx): the base rate, unit dose and generic. The first two: the base 
rate & unit dose shows that, they increase the processes of drug product selection but in the 
case of dispensing fee on generic if the state has them in the regulation, the fee will decrease 
generic substitution. 
Subsequently, a “Dispensing Fee Base Rate” regulation showed that, measure by 
prescription (Rx) was significant in 14 therapeutic category and in 3 of them not; and that the 
maximum decrease will be 3.81 percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” 
therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the 
Basic Dispensing Fee and the increase will be 21.25 percentage point in “Biological” 
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therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the 
Basic Dispensing Fee. After that, a “Dispensing Fee on Generic” regulation showed that, 
measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 13 therapeutic category and in 4 of them not; 
and that the maximum decrease will be 5.73 percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic 
category if In the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Dispensing 
Fee on Generic and the increase will be 1.71 percentage point in “Hematological” therapeutic 
category if In the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Dispensing 
Fee on Generic. 
Then, even thought “Institutional Dispensing Fee” was not significant nationally by 
therapeutic category was different, therefore, an “Institutional Dispensing Fee” regulation 
showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 6 therapeutic category and in 11 
of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.84 percentage point in “Genitourinary” 
therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the 
Institutional Dispensing Fee and the increase will be 0.50 percentage point in 
“Gastrointestinal” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that 
change in $1 the Institutional Dispensing Fee. 
Finally, after the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Unit Dose 
Dispensing Fee” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 13 
therapeutic category and in 4 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.18 
percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product 
selection States that change in $1 the Unit Dose Dispensing Fee and the increase will be 
1.45 percentage point in “Miscellaneous Products” therapeutic category if In the process of 
drug product selection States that change in $1 the Unit Dose Dispensing Fee. 
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5.2.2 Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) measure by 
Reimbursement ($) 
Next rate calculated and analyzed was the percentage of all prescribed as off-patent 
drugs and was defining as a Generic Prescribing rate (GPR) measure by reimbursement ($)  
. As a result, nationally, positive formulary is not significant in the process of drug product 
selection measure by reimbursement ($) and non-formulary is significant measure by 
reimbursement ($) but decrease the percentage of all prescribed as off-patent drugs if the 
state have them in their regulations.  
After the seventeen therapeutic category were analyze, even thought positive 
formulary was not significant nationally by therapeutic category was different, therefore, in 9 
therapeutic category were significant and in 8 of them not; where the maximum decrease will 
be 10.23 percentage point in “Central Nervous System” therapeutic category and the 
increase will be 7.88 percentage point in “Stimulants/Anti-Obesity/Anorexia” therapeutic 
category. Then, a non-formulary regulation measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 8 
therapeutic category were significant and in 9 of them not; where the maximum decrease will 
be 7.857 percentage point in “Central Nervous System” therapeutic category and the 
increase will be 7.294 percentage point in “Nutritional Products”  therapeutic category. 
Other list was another of the regulations that was selected to be part of this study and 
is significant and increase the process of drug product selection when was measure by 
reimbursement ($). Then After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, “Others 
list” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 11 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 6 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 6.21 
percentage point in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” therapeutic category and the increase will be 
18.02 percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic category. 
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Also, the used of the Approved Drug Product book, commonly known as the “Orange 
Book” in the state regulation is not significant when is measure by reimbursement ($).  But 
after the seventeen therapeutic category were analyze, Orange Book regulation measure by 
reimbursement ($) showed that, in 9 therapeutic category were significant and in 8 of them 
not; where the maximum decrease will be 4.42 percentage point in “Stimulants/Anti-
Obesity/Anorexia” therapeutic category and the increase will be 6.11 percentage point in 
“Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category. 
Drug product selection law, vary significantly among states; as a result, in states 
where pharmacists must substitute a less expensive generic drug, also called “mandatory” 
substitution regulation; is not significant when was measure by reimbursement ($). But, after 
the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze,  “Permissive or Mandatory” regulation 
measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 11 therapeutic category were significant and 
in 6 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 4.89 percentage point in 
“Hematological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 9.05 percentage point in 
“Biological” therapeutic category.  
As was previously mentioned, there are ways to prevent substitution in a prescription 
by prescribers. One of them is when a prescriber written in words “Dispensing as Written”, 
“No substitution” or an equivalent message that prevent a pharmacist to substitute the 
prescription. Another example is when prescriber writes the Initials for example: “DAW” or 
“NS”. Finally, is when prescriber must check a box on a prescription where is labeled like for 
example: “Dispensing as Written” or “Generic equivalent Allowed". In our study once again, 
the three of the alternatives that were mention before, were significant: the Check Box, Initials 
& Written in Words but all of them result in decrease the processes of drug product selection 
when were measure by reimbursement ($). 
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After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a “Check Box” regulation 
showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 11 therapeutic category were significant and 
in 6 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 14.25 percentage point in “Biological” 
therapeutic category and the increase will be 4.76 percentage point in “Anti-Infective” 
therapeutic category. Afterwards,  “Initials” regulation showed that, measure by 
reimbursement ($), in 12 therapeutic category were significant and in 5 of them not; where 
the maximum decrease will be 9.29 percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & 
Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 3.89 percentage point in “Anti-
Infective” therapeutic category. Finally, “Written in Words” regulation showed that, measure 
by reimbursement ($), in 12 therapeutic category were significant and in 5 of them not; where 
the maximum decrease will be 10.93 percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic category 
and the increase will be 3.01 percentage point in “Anti-Infective” therapeutic category. 
A cost savings pass-on as was mention before was defined as a regulation that 
requires the pharmacist to pass-on to the consumer all or part of the cost savings from 
dispensing a non-innovator multi-source drug and was separated in two: Patients Cost 
Saving by Portion of cost and Patients Cost Saving by Full saving, but both Patients Cost 
Saving are not significant in the processes of drug product selection when is measure by 
reimbursement ($).  
But even thought “Patients Cost Saving by Portion of cost” and “Patients Cost Saving 
by Full saving” were not significant nationally, by therapeutic category was different, 
subsequently, “Patients Cost Saving by Portion of cost” regulation showed that, measure by 
reimbursement ($) showed that, in 8 therapeutic category were significant and in 9 of them 
not; where the maximum decrease will be 6.41 percentage point in “Nutritional Products” 
therapeutic category and the increase will be 6.10 percentage point in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category. Also is the case of,  “Patients Cost 
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Saving by Full saving” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 
10 therapeutic category were significant and in 7 of them not; where the maximum decrease 
will be 16.39 percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 
9.45 percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category.  
Then, for the percentage of all prescribed as off-patent drugs, in states that 
determines whether patients can influence the generic substitution process at the point of the 
pharmacy, Patient Consent regulation was not significant measure by reimbursement ($). But 
even thought “Patient Consent” was not significant nationally, by therapeutic category was 
different. Then, a “Patient Consent” regulation measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 
8 therapeutic category were significant and in 9 of them not; where the maximum decrease 
will be 8.45 percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 4.90 
percentage point in “Hematological” therapeutic category.  
In the Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR), another regulation that affects Pharmacy 
Profit was the Average Wholesale Price discount. Therefore, the results show that, measure 
by reimbursement ($), the two AWP discount are significant.  In “AWP Basic Discount”, the 
bigger discount that manufacturers offered to a pharmacy, the pharmacy would receive a 
lower payment, as result, would decrease the processes of drug product selection. In the 
other hand, in “AWP by Channel of Distribution” the bigger discount that manufacturers 
offered to a pharmacy, the pharmacy would receive higher payment, as a result, would 
increase the processes of drug product selection.   
Then, after the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “AWP Basic 
Discount” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 11 
therapeutic category were significant and in 6 of them not; and that the maximum decrease 
will be 0.01 % in “Anti-Infective” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product 
selection States change in 1% AWP Basic Discount and the increase will be 0.01 % in “Misc. 
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Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product 
selection States change in 1% AWP Basic Discount. After that, “AWP Generic Discount” 
regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 8 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 9 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.003 
% in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if in the process of drug 
product selection States change in 1% AWP Generic Discount and the increase will be 0.002 
% in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product 
selection States change in 1% AWP Generic Discount. Then,  “AWP by Channel of 
Distribution” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 8 
therapeutic category were significant and in 9 of them not; and that the maximum decrease 
will be 0.001 % in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if in the 
process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP by Channel of Distribution and 
the increase will be 0.001 % in “Respiratory” therapeutic category if in the process of drug 
product selection States change in 1% AWP by Channel of Distribution. 
Finally, some regulations affect directly to the Pharmacy Profit. Is the case with, 
Dispensing Fee in pharmacy, in the study, three type of the dispensing were significant 
measure by reimbursement ($): the base rate, unit dose and generic. The first two, the base 
rate & unit dose shows that, they increase the processes of drug product selection but in the 
case of dispensing fee on generic if the state has them in the regulation, the fee will decrease 
generic substitution. 
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Dispensing Fee Base 
Rate” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 10 therapeutic category 
were significant and in 7 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 4.16 
percentage point in “Nutritional Products” therapeutic category if In the process of drug 
product selection States that change in $1 the Basic Dispensing Fee and the increase will be 
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3.85 percentage point in “Stimulants/Anti-Obesity/Anorexia” therapeutic category if In the 
process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Basic Dispensing Fee. 
After that, “Dispensing Fee on Generic” regulation showed that, measure by 
reimbursement ($), in 10 therapeutic category were significant and in 7 of them not; and that 
the maximum decrease will be 2.62 percentage point in “Stimulants/Anti-Obesity/Anorexia” 
therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the 
Dispensing Fee on Generic and the increase will be 2.87 percentage point in “Anti-Infective” 
therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the 
Dispensing Fee on Generic. 
Then, even thought “Institutional Dispensing Fee” was not significant nationally by 
therapeutic category was different, therefore, “Institutional Dispensing Fee” regulation 
showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 5 therapeutic category were significant and in 
12 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.71 percentage point in 
“Genitourinary” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that 
change in $1 the Institutional Dispensing Fee and the increase will be 0.63 percentage point 
in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection 
States that change in $1 the Institutional Dispensing Fee. 
Finally, “Unit Dose Dispensing Fee” regulation showed that, measure by 
Reimbursement ($) showed that, in 9 therapeutic category were significant and in 8 of them 
not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.60 percentage point in “Stimulants/Anti-
Obesity/Anorexia” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that 
change in $1 the Unit dose Dispensing Fee and the increase will be 2.04 percentage point in 
“Nutritional Products” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States 
that change in $1 the Unit Dose Dispensing Fee. 
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5.3 Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR) 
5.3.1 Generic Dispensing Rate (GPR) measure by Prescription 
(Rx) 
The last rate calculated and analyzed was the percentage of off-patent drugs 
dispensed as generic defined as a Generic Dispensing rate (GDR), as a result, a positive 
formulary and non-formulary is significant in the process of drug product selection but both of 
them decrease the percentage of all prescribed as off-patent drugs if the state have them in 
their regulations measure by prescription (Rx) and decrease the percentage of all prescribed 
as off-patent drugs if the state have them in their regulations. 
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a positive formulary 
regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 10 therapeutic 
categories and in 7 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 8.80 percentage 
points in “Nutritional Products” therapeutic category and the increase will be 2.34 percentage 
points in “Anti-Infective” therapeutic category. And, a non-formulary regulation showed that, 
measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 12 therapeutic category and in 5 of them not;  
that maximum decrease will be 8.982 percentage point in “Nutritional Products” therapeutic 
category and the minimum decrease will be 1.261 percentage point in “Central Nervous 
System”  therapeutic category.  
As we mentioned before, formularies are not the only drug products selection list; 
therefore, Others list was another of the regulations that was selected to be part of this study 
but is not significant when is measure by prescription (Rx). But after the seventeen 
therapeutic categories were analyze, “Others list” regulation showed that, measure by 
prescription (Rx) was significant in 9 therapeutic category and in 8 of them not; and that the 
maximum decrease will be 4.28 percentage point in “Endocrine & Metabolic Drugs” 
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therapeutic category and the increase will be 16.13 percentage point in “Stimulants/Anti-
Obesity/Anorexia” therapeutic category.  
Approved Drug Product book, commonly known as the “Orange Book” was other 
regulation included in the state regulation analysis and is not significant when measure by 
prescription (Rx); but after the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, Orange Book 
regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 10 therapeutic 
categories and in 7 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 10.36 percentage 
points in “Biological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 2.34 percentage points in 
“Stimulants/Anti-Obesity/Anorexia” therapeutic category. 
Then, for the percentage of off-patent drugs dispensed as generic in states where 
pharmacists must substitute a less expensive generic drug or “mandatory’ substitution; the 
regulation is significant but decreases the processes of drug product selection when was 
measure by prescription (Rx). As a consequence, a “Permissive or Mandatory” regulation 
showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 9 therapeutic categories and in 
8 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 13.97 percentage points in “Biological” 
therapeutic category and the increase will be 4.03 percentage points in “Neuromuscular 
Drugs” therapeutic category.  
There are many ways to prevent substitution in a prescription by prescribers, one of 
them, is when prescriber written in words “Dispensing as Written”, “No substitution” or an 
equivalent notation that prevent a pharmacist to substitute the prescription. Another example 
is when prescriber writes the Initials ex: “DAW” or “NS” and the final alternative; is when 
prescriber must check a box on a prescription where is labeled like ex: “Dispensing as 
Written” or “Generic equivalent Allowed. In our study once again, the three of the alternatives 
that were mention before, were significant: the Check Box, Initials & Written in Words but all 
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of them result in increase the processes of drug product selection when were measure by 
prescription (Rx). 
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a “Check Box” regulation 
showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 9 therapeutic category and in 8 
of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 4.58 percentage point in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 6.01 
percentage point in “Genitourinary” therapeutic category. Afterwards, “Initials” regulation 
showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 11 therapeutic categories and in 
6 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 8.49 percentage points in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 6.95 
percentage points in “Nutritional Products” therapeutic category. Finally, “Written in Words” 
regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 13 therapeutic 
category and in 4 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 1.21 percentage point 
in “Central Nervous System” therapeutic category and the increase will be 6.99 percentage 
point in “Genitourinary” therapeutic category. 
A cost savings pass-on as was mention before was defined as a regulation that 
requires the pharmacist to pass-on to the consumer all or part of the cost savings from 
dispensing a non-innovator multi-source drug and was separated in two: Patients Cost 
Saving by Portion of cost and Patients Cost Saving by Full saving, both of them are not 
significant when were measure by prescription (Rx).  
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Patients Cost Saving 
by Portion of cost” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 7 
therapeutic category and in 10 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 9.64 
percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 2.69 percentage 
point in “Nutritional Products” therapeutic category. Then, a “Patients Cost Saving by Full 
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saving” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 9 therapeutic 
category and in 8 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 15.64 percentage point 
in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 9.43 
percentage point in “Respiratory” therapeutic category.  
Again, for the percentage of off-patent drugs dispensed as generic in states where 
pharmacists must substitute a less expensive generic drug; Patient Consent regulation 
determines whether patients can influence the generic substitution process at the point of the 
pharmacy, is significant but decreases the processes of generic substitution when was 
measure by prescription (Rx). Then, after the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, 
a “Patient Consent” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 
14 therapeutic categories and in 3 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 2.74 
percentage points in “Hematological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 3.27 
percentage points in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category.  
Average Wholesale Price (AWP) discount is a regulation that affects Pharmacy Profit. 
This discount was defined in both previous rates Net Generic Rate (NGR) and Generic 
Prescribing Rate (GPR). Therefore, after was measure by prescriptions (Rx) the three 
different AWP discount shows that; in an “AWP Basic Discount” the bigger discount that 
manufacturers offer to a pharmacy, pharmacy will be receive lower payment therefore will 
decrease the processes of drug product selection. In the other hand, “AWP Generic 
Discount” the bigger discount that manufacturers offer to a pharmacy, pharmacy will receive 
more payment therefore will increase the processes of drug product selection; but in this case 
a third discount was significant, this was the “AWP Channel Distribution A” that included: 
Institutions, Independent Pharmacy, Pharmacy Chain, etc; and in this the bigger discount that 
manufacturers offer to a pharmacy, pharmacy will be receive lower payment therefore will 
decrease the processes of drug product selection.  
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After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “AWP Basic Discount” 
regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 10 therapeutic 
category and in 7 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.01 % in “Endocrine & 
Metabolic Drugs” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection States 
change in 1% AWP Basic Discount and the increase will be 0.01 % in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product 
selection States change in 1% AWP Basic Discount. After that, an “AWP Generic Discount” 
regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 9 therapeutic 
category and in 8 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.01 % in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product 
selection States change in 1% AWP Generic Discount and the increase will be 0.003 % in 
“Endocrine & Metabolic Drugs” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product 
selection States change in 1% AWP Generic Discount. Then, an “AWP by Channel of 
Distribution” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 12 
therapeutic category and in 5 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.001 % in 
“Genitourinary” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection States change 
in 1% AWP by Channel of Distribution and the increase will be 0.001 % in “Biological” 
therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP by 
Channel of Distribution. 
Finally, as was mentioned Dispensing Fee regulation affect directly to the Pharmacy 
Profit. And is define as, an amount of money pay to a pharmacy when dispensing a 
prescription, therefore, Pharmacy receive a fixed payment (reimbursement) for the 
transaction. In the study, for the case of Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR), two type of the 
dispensing fee were significant: the unit dose and generic. The dispensing fee on generic 
shows that decrease the processes of drug product selection but in the case of dispensing 
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fee on unit doses if the state has them in the regulation, the fee will increase generic substitution 
measure by prescription (Rx). 
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Dispensing Fee Base 
Rate” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) was significant in 12 therapeutic 
category and in 5 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 5.27 percentage point 
in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if In the process of drug 
product selection States that change in $1 the Basic Dispensing Fee and the increase will be 
1.48 percentage point in “Anti-Infective” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product 
selection States that change in $1 the Basic Dispensing Fee. 
A “Dispensing Fee on Generic” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) 
was significant in 9 therapeutic category and in 8 of them not; and that the maximum 
decrease will be 2.43 percentage point in “Respiratory” therapeutic category if In the process 
of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Dispensing Fee on Generic and the 
increase will be 1.60 percentage point in “Antineoplastics” therapeutic category if In the 
process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Dispensing Fee on Generic. 
Then, even thought “Institutional Dispensing Fee” was not significant nationally by 
therapeutic category was different, therefore after the seventeen therapeutic categories were 
analyze, an “Institutional Dispensing Fee” regulation showed that, measure by prescription 
(Rx) was significant in 4 therapeutic category and in 13 of them not; and that the maximum 
decrease will be 0.70 percentage point in “Miscellaneous Products” therapeutic category if In 
the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Institutional Dispensing 
Fee and the increase will be 0.99 percentage point in “Hematological” therapeutic category if 
In the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Institutional Dispensing 
Fee. 
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Finally, “Unit Dose Dispensing Fee” regulation showed that, measure by prescription (Rx) 
was significant in 9 therapeutic category and in 8 of them not; and that the maximum 
decrease will be 0.44 percentage point in “Anti-Infective” therapeutic category if In the 
process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Unit Dose Dispensing Fee and 
the increase will be 1.86 percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” 
therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the 
Unit Dose Dispensing Fee. 
 
5.3.2 Generic Dispensing Rate (GPR) measure by 
Reimbursement ($) 
The final rate calculated and analyzed was the percentage of off-patent drugs 
dispensed as generic and was defined as a Generic Dispensing rate (GDR) measure by 
reimbursement ($), as a result, a positive formulary is not significant in the process of drug 
product selection and non-formulary is significant measure by reimbursement ($) but 
decrease the percentage of all prescribed as off-patent drugs if the state have them in their 
regulations. Then as a result, after the seventeen therapeutic category were analyze, a 
positive formulary regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 9 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 8 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 13.73 
percentage point in “Hematological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 14.06 
percentage point in “Biological”  therapeutic category. Then, a non-formulary regulation 
showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 10 therapeutic category were 
significant and in 7 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 17.28 percentage point 
in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 7.85 
percentage point in “Miscellaneous Products”  therapeutic category. 
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As we mentioned before, Others list was another of the regulations that was selected 
to be part of this study and is significant and increase the process of drug product selection 
when was measure by reimbursement ($). Then After the seventeen therapeutic categories 
were analyze, an “Others list” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 10 
therapeutic category were significant and in 7 of them not; where the maximum increase will 
be 20.65 percentage point in “Stimulants/Anti-Obesity/Anorexia” therapeutic category and the 
minimum increase will be 3.84 percentage point in “Analgesics & Anesthetics” therapeutic 
category. 
Approved Drug Product book, commonly known as the “Orange Book” was other 
regulation included in the state regulation analysis and is not significant when is measure by 
reimbursement ($). But after the seventeen therapeutic category were analyze, an Orange 
Book regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 7 therapeutic category were 
significant and in 10 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 18.96 percentage 
point in “Biological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 3.99 percentage point in 
“Stimulants/Anti-Obesity/Anorexia” therapeutic category. 
Then, for the percentage of off-patent drugs dispensed as generic in states where 
pharmacists must substitute a less expensive generic drug or “mandatory’ substitution; the 
regulation is significant but decreases the processes of drug product selection when was 
measure by reimbursement ($). As a consequence, “Permissive or Mandatory” regulation 
showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 12 therapeutic category were significant and 
in 5 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 18.49 percentage point in “Biological” 
therapeutic category and the increase will be 4.197 percentage point in “Genitourinary” 
therapeutic category.  
In addition, there are a lot of ways to prevent substitution in a prescription by a 
prescribers, one of them, is when prescriber written in words “Dispensing as Written”, “No 
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substitution” or an equivalent notation that prevent a pharmacist to substitute the prescription. 
Another example is when prescriber writes the Initials ex: “DAW” or “NS” and the final 
alternative; is when prescriber must check a box on a prescription where is labeled like ex: 
“Dispensing as Written” or “Generic equivalent Allowed. In our study once again, the three of 
the alternatives that were mention (Check Box, Initials & Written in Words) measure by 
reimbursement ($) only “Written in Words” was significant increasing the processes of drug 
product selection. 
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a “Check Box” regulation 
showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 11 therapeutic category were significant and 
in 6 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 12.30 percentage point in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 13.65 
percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic category. Afterwards, “Initials” regulation showed 
that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 8 therapeutic category were significant and in 9 of 
them not; where the maximum decrease will be 10.46 percentage point in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the increase will be 4.42 
percentage point in “Genitourinary” therapeutic category. Finally, “Written in Words” 
regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 8 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 9 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 8.16 
percentage point in “Hematological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 10.98 
percentage point in “Genitourinary” therapeutic category. 
A cost savings pass-on as was mention before was defined as a regulation that 
requires the pharmacist to pass-on to the consumer all or part of the cost savings from 
dispensing a non-innovator multi-source drug, the variable was separated in two: Patients 
Cost Saving by Portion of cost and Patients Cost Saving by Full saving, and Patients Cost 
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Saving by Portion of cost was significant when was measure by reimbursement ($) but 
decreases the processes of drug product selection   
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Patients Cost Saving 
by Portion of cost” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 9 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 8 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 13.31 
percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic category and the increase will be 4.61 percentage 
point in “Miscellaneous Products” therapeutic category. And, a “Patients Cost Saving by Full 
saving” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 7 therapeutic category 
were significant and in 10 of them not; where the maximum decrease will be 10.37 
percentage point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category and the 
increase will be 7.96 percentage point in “Respiratory” therapeutic category.  
Again, for the percentage of off-patent drugs dispensed as generic in states where 
pharmacists must substitute a less expensive generic drug; Patient Consent regulation 
determines whether patients can influence the generic substitution process at the point of the 
pharmacy, is not significant when was measure by reimbursement ($). Then, after the 
seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, a “Patient Consent” regulation showed that, 
measure by reimbursement ($), in 9 therapeutic category were significant and in 8 of them 
not; where the maximum decrease will be 6.65 percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic 
category and the increase will be 5.03 percentage point in “Genitourinary” therapeutic 
category.  
Additionally, Average Wholesale Price (AWP) discount is a regulation that affects 
Pharmacy Profit. This discount was defined in both previous rates Net Generic Rate (NGR) 
and Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR). Therefore, measure by reimbursement ($), the result 
shows that in an “AWP Basic Discount” the bigger discount that manufacturers offer to a 
pharmacy, pharmacy will be receive lower payment therefore will decrease the processes of 
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drug product selection. In the other hand, “AWP Generic Discount” the bigger discount that 
manufacturers offer to a pharmacy, pharmacy will receive more payment therefore will 
increase the processes of drug product selection; and in the case of “AWP Channel 
Distribution A” that included: Institutions, Independent Pharmacy, Pharmacy Chain, etc; the 
bigger discount that manufacturers offer to a pharmacy, pharmacy will be receive lower 
payment therefore will decrease the processes of drug product selection.  
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “AWP Basic Discount” 
regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 7 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 10 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.009 
% in “Miscellaneous Products” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product selection 
States change in 1% AWP Basic Discount and the increase will be 0.011 % in “Misc. 
Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product 
selection States change in 1% AWP Basic Discount. After that, “AWP Generic Discount” 
regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 13 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 4 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.011 
% in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if in the process of drug 
product selection States change in 1% AWP Generic Discount and the increase will be 0.004 
% in “Endocrine & Metabolic Drugs” therapeutic category if in the process of drug product 
selection States change in 1% AWP Generic Discount. 
Then, “AWP by Channel of Distribution” regulation showed that, measure by 
reimbursement ($) showed that, in 10 therapeutic category were significant and in 7 of them 
not; and that the maximum decrease will be 0.001 % in “Genitourinary” therapeutic category if 
in the process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP by Channel of Distribution 
and the increase will be 0.002 % in “Miscellaneous Products” therapeutic category if in the 
process of drug product selection States change in 1% AWP by Channel of Distribution. 
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Finally, Dispensing Fee regulation affect directly to the Pharmacy Profit. And is define 
as, an amount of money pay to a pharmacy when dispensing a prescription, therefore, 
Pharmacy receive a fixed payment (reimbursement) for the transaction. In the study, for the 
case of Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR), two type of the dispensing fee were significant: the 
unit dose and generic. The dispensing fee on generic shows that, decrease the processes of 
drug product selection and in the case of dispensing fee on unit doses if the state has them in 
the regulation, the fee will increase generic substitution measure by reimbursement ($). 
After the seventeen therapeutic categories were analyze, an “Dispensing Fee Base 
Rate” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 9 therapeutic category were 
significant and in 8 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 8.73 percentage 
point in “Misc. Psychotherapeutic & Neurology” therapeutic category if In the process of drug 
product selection States that change in $1 the Basic Dispensing Fee and the increase will be 
3.92 percentage point in “Hematological” therapeutic category if In the process of drug 
product selection States that change in $1 the Basic Dispensing Fee. After that,  “Dispensing 
Fee on Generic” regulation showed that, measure by reimbursement ($), in 10 therapeutic 
category were significant and in 7 of them not; and that the maximum decrease will be 5.19 
percentage point in “Hematological” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product 
selection States that change in $1 the Dispensing Fee on Generic and the increase will be 
0.92 percentage point in “Topical Products” therapeutic category if In the process of drug 
product selection States that change in $1 the Dispensing Fee on Generic. 
Then, even thought “Institutional Dispensing Fee” was not significant nationally by 
therapeutic category was different, therefore measure by reimbursement ($) showed that, in 5 
therapeutic category were significant and in 12 of them not; and that the maximum decrease 
will be 1.11 percentage point in “Miscellaneous Products” therapeutic category if In the 
process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Institutional Dispensing Fee 
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and the increase will be 1.41 percentage point in “Biological” therapeutic category if In the 
process of drug product selection States that change in $1 the Institutional Dispensing Fee. 
Finally, a “Unit Dose Dispensing Fee” regulation showed that, measure by 
reimbursement ($) showed that, in 11 therapeutic category were significant and in 6 of them 
not; and that the minimum decrease will be 0.45 percentage point in “Central Nervous 
System” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection States that change in 
$1 the Unit dose Dispensing Fee and the maximum increase will be 3.40 percentage point in 
“Miscellaneous Products” therapeutic category if In the process of drug product selection 
States that change in $1 the Unit Dose Dispensing Fee. 
5.4 Generic Rates variation across the States and 
U.S. Medicaid  
Generics rates (Net Generic, Generic Prescribing and Generic Dispensing) were 
calculated in each States, excluding: Arizona and Tennessee. Given the size of the data set, 
the results were arranged in increasing magnitude, the minimum, 10th percentile, 25th 
percentile, the median, the mean, 75th percentile, 90th percentile and the maximum.  
This is a summary of the data (a descriptive analysis), were none statistical analysis 
was made and were not control for regulations or any other factors. Therefore, percentiles 
were calculated (calculations were by quarter by year) and three points were randomly 
selected to show the behavior of the rates.  
5.4.1 Net Generic rate (NGR)  
Net Generic Rate (NGR) is the measure that indicates the percentage of all drugs dispensed as 
generic; therefore, across those three randomly selected points, it is possible to see a trend where, 
almost in all percentiles, the percentage of all drugs dispensed as a generic measure by prescriptions 
and reimbursement was almost the same, as well as the increment (Table.IV).  
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Exhibit 11 shows, that the distribution of all drugs dispensed as a generic measure by prescriptions 
in second quarter of 1991was in the order of the 40% in each percentiles as well as second quarter of 
2000. In the second quarter of 2008 was an increment in the percentage of all drugs dispensed as a 
generic in the order of the 60% in each percentile. Likewise, the distribution of all drugs dispensed as a 
generic measure by reimbursement in each of the points was between 12% and 25% in each of 
percentile. 
Table IV.  
1991-2 2000-2 2008-2 1991-2 2000-2 2008-2
10th percentile 14.50% 13.40% 12.50% 40.70% 44.00% 62.10%
25th percentile 17.20% 14.30% 15.00% 42.00% 44.60% 64.60%
Median 18.90% 16.80% 18.30% 45.10% 47.60% 68.50%
75th percentile 20.80% 18.20% 21.70% 49.80% 49.90% 70.60%
90th percentile 24.10% 19.60% 24.70% 53.60% 52.00% 72.60%
Net Generic rate (NGR)
Measured by Reimbursement ($) Measured by Prescriptions  (Rxs)
 
5.4.2 Generic Prescribing rate (GPR)  
Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) indicates the percentage of Off-Patent drugs dispensed as a 
generic. As a result, across those three randomly selected points, again is possible to see a trend 
where, almost in all percentiles, the percentage of Off-Patent drugs dispensed as a generic measure by 
prescriptions and reimbursement was almost the same, as well as the increment (Table.V).  
Exhibit 12 shows, that the distribution of Off-Patent drugs dispensed as a generic measure by 
prescriptions in second quarter of 1991was in the order of the 60% in each percentiles as well as 
second quarter of 2008. In the second quarter of 2000 was an increment in the percentage of Off-Patent 
drugs dispensed as a generic in the order of the 50% in each percentile. 
Similarly, the distribution of Off-Patent drugs dispensed as a generic measure by reimbursement in 
each of the points was diverse, in second quarter of 1991was in the order of the 30% in each 
percentiles, in second quarter of 2000 was in the order of the 20% in each percentiles and in second 
quarter of 2008 was between 17% and 29% in each of percentile (Table.V). 
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Table V. 
1991-2 2000-2 2008-2 1991-2 2000-2 2008-2
10th percentile 32.70% 19.10% 17.30% 61.00% 51.60% 65.70%
25th percentile 34.90% 21.50% 19.30% 63.70% 54.40% 67.90%
Median 37.70% 23.20% 22.70% 66.50% 56.40% 71.50%
75th percentile 40.30% 25.20% 25.60% 67.90% 58.00% 73.30%
90th percentile 42.90% 26.50% 29.40% 72.90% 59.90% 75.40%
Generic Prescribing rate (GPR)
Measured by Reimbursement ($) Measured by Prescriptions  (Rxs)
 
5.4.3 Generic Dispensing rate (GDR) 
Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR) is the number of prescriptions filled with a generic as a percentage 
of all drugs Prescribed as Off-Patent.  As a result, across those three randomly selected points, again is 
possible to see a trend where (Table.VI) the distribution of the number of prescriptions filled with a 
generic as a percentage of All drugs Prescribed as Off-Patent measure by prescriptions in second 
quarter of 1991was in the order of the 60% in each percentiles, in second quarter of 2000 was in the 
order of the 80% in each percentiles and In the second quarter of 2008 was in the order of the 90% in 
each percentile. 
In the same way, the distribution of the number of prescriptions filled with a generic as a 
percentage of All drugs Prescribed as Off-Patent measure by reimbursement in each of the points was 
diverse, in second quarter of 1991was between 40% and 60% in each percentiles, in second quarter of 
2000 was between 64% and 77% in each percentiles and in second quarter of 2008 was between 69% 
and 89% in each of percentile (Table.VI). 
Table VI. 
1991-2 2000-2 2008-2 1991-2 2000-2 2008-2
10th percentile 41.60% 64.20% 69.30% 63.40% 81.50% 93.60%
25th percentile 46.70% 67.20% 76.80% 65.90% 82.80% 95.20%
Median 50.90% 70.90% 83.00% 69.90% 84.50% 96.00%
75th percentile 54.80% 73.50% 85.90% 72.90% 86.40% 96.90%
90th percentile 60.90% 77.10% 89.30% 76.20% 87.60% 97.50%
Generic Dispensing rate (GDR)
Measured by Reimbursement ($) Measured by Prescriptions  (Rxs)
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5.5 Limitations  
 
This study considered factors and regulations that affect the process of drug product 
selection, but all the results and conclusion should be understand under the frame of these 
limitations.    
The period of the study was 18 years from 1991 until 2008, but Medicaid State Drug 
Utilization Data from Center of Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) is reported by quarter 
by year, therefore, the rates were calculated base on market status, and every time that a 
drug change market status (lost patent protection and move from Single Source product to 
Innovator Multi-Source and Non-Innovator Multi-Source) therefore the error or variability will be 
between three month, where were not able to know the moment when medications change 
status. 
Another factor is the availability of Innovator Multi-Source and Non-Innovator Multi-
Source medications in each of the therapeutic categories that were use in the study. As was 
mentioned, to separate each therapeutic categories were used a 14 digit code, also know as 
a Generic Product Identifier (GPI) code, but because the data had Over-the-Counter (OTC) 
drugs, a 16 digit code was created (14 digit code + 2 that represent Rx or OTC); base on that, 
was able to determine what drugs were able to be substituted. However, some of these 
therapeutic categories were relatively new ex: Biological and in the same case the 
regulations to that specific category have not been 100% define; therefore the Generic Rate 
in each of the cases were low or cero because the absence of the generic alternative. 
Other, factor to take in consideration is “physicians’ preferences”; in our data set we 
don’t have variables that were measure that factor or that indicates “physicians’ preferences”. 
What we have is the outcome of what physicians prescribed, therefore will be useful to 
measure or have a parameter that tells you that. 
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Finally, is important to situate on perspective the Population of the data that was 
study (The Medicaid population by state), the main reason of that is because, as a 
government program is important for them the cost, therefore, the incentive to used generic 
alternative if it is available in the market is very important, To help to reduce and control de 
cost or reimbursement. 
5.6 Conclusions  
The Generic Rates calculated and the empirical model in this study, were able to 
explain the dynamic in the last 18 years of the generic substitution in Medicaid program. 
In the descriptive part, Generic rates successfully show how the use of generic 
medication was and how product substitution happens.  
The sample of the data (the complete universe of drugs that were reimbursed in 
Medicaid program) was able to show how the cost per prescription ($/Rx) has increase 
substantially and since 2001 in exponential way in Single Source products and Innovator 
Multiple Source but at the same time, Non-Innovator Multiple Source Product – also known 
as Generic product – has increase in a very low proportion that the slope of the line is almost 
flat  
Consequently, the percentage of all dispensed as generic – also known as Net 
Generic Rate (NGR) – have increased in the 18 years of the study with a little decline during 
the period of 1999 and recovered in 2004 and since that year was increasing. Then, the 
percentage of all prescribed as Off-patent – also known as Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR) – 
was stable in the first four year, then in 1997 decline a little more drastic than NGR but 
recovered in 2004 and since that year was increasing. Finally, the percentage of Off-Patent 
dispensed as Generic – also known as Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR) – Since 1991 until 
2009 was increasing. 
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Moreover, after the nineteen regulations were testing to determine the effects of them 
in each of the generic rates (measure by prescriptions (Rx) and by reimbursement ($) the 
trend show that most of the impact that these regulations is reduce or decrease the use of 
generic medication rather than increase them. 
Finally, others factors like: types of therapeutics categories, the lack of regulation for 
specific type of medications Ex: Biological, medications that were under patent protection in 
the compete period (18 years) because they were new in the market; show us that there so 
many changes in the market dynamic that when is control by state and time, every single 
time that, a study with this dimensions want to be done, has to be in consideration all these 
factor and more.    
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GLOSSARY 
Single-Source (SS) Drug : A single-source drug is a product that is produced or distributed 
under an original new drug application (NDA) approved by the FDA, including a drug product 
marketed by cross-licensed producers or distributors operating under the new drug 
application and is under patent or exclusivity protection. Usually, a single source drug is 
identified as a brand name drug that has no generic equivalent in the market. 
 Innovator Multi-Source (IMS) Drug: An innovator multi-source drug is a product that was 
first authorized for marketing under an original NDA approved by the FDA, but is off-patent or 
has no exclusivity protection however is still marketed by the original manufacturer. Usually, 
these IMS products have one or more generic equivalents in the market. Generally, these 
products are referred to as off-patent brand name drugs that have generic equivalents in the 
market 
Non-Innovator Multi-Source (NMS) Drug: A non-innovator multiple-source drug is a 
product that has the same standards as an innovator multi-source drug (bioequivalent and 
effectiveness) and identical composition but is marketed or sold by manufacturers or labelers 
other than the original manufacturer. It is a drug that is not under any patent or exclusivity 
protection and is identified as a generic drug. 
Net Generic Rate (NGR):  Net Generic Rate is defined as the ratio of the number of non-
innovator multi-source drugs divided by all the drugs (single source, innovator multi-source 
and non-innovator multi-source) that were reimbursed by Medicaid program in each State in 
a specific period of time. The formula is: NMS / (SS + IMS + NMS). 
Generic Dispensing Rate (GDR): Generic Dispensing Rate is defined as the ratio of 
the number of non-innovator multi-source drugs divided by just innovator multi-
source and non-innovator multi-source drugs that were reimbursed by Medicaid 
program in each State in a specific period of time. This index determines how 
frequently a generic drug is dispensed when a generic version of a brand drug is in 
the market. Also sometimes mention as the generic “penetration” or “efficacy” rate 
(Levinson D. (2006). The formula is: NMS / (IMS + NMS). 
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Generic Prescribing Rate (GPR): Generic Prescribing Rate is defined as the ratio of 
the number of innovator multi-source and non-innovator multi-source drugs divided 
by all the drugs (single source, innovator multi-source and non-innovator multi-
source) that were reimbursed by Medicaid program in each State in a specific period 
of time. Is the percentage of all prescriptions filled that were generics drugs 
(Levinson D. (2006). The formula is: (IMS + NMS) / (SS + IMS + NMS). 
Generic Substitution: Generic substitution is defined as a process where a different 
drug product is dispensed than the drug product that was prescribed, but is 
considered therapeutically equivalent. Generic substitution is based on the concept 
of therapeutic equivalence that is the generic product will produce the exact 
equivalent clinical effects (both therapeutic and toxic) as the reference product when 
administered under the identical conditions in the same dosage in the same patient. 
When authorizing generic substitution the practitioner expects therapeutics 
equivalence between the generic product & the reference product therefore no 
dosage adjustment or additional monitoring should be required (above and beyond 
that which would normally occur with the reference product. (James D. Henderson 
and Richard H. Esham (2001).  
Therapeutic Equivalence: Drug products can be substituted for other drugs if it will 
produce the same clinical effect and safety profile as the prescribed product. Drug 
products are considered to be therapeutically equivalent only if they meet these 
criteria:  contain the same active ingredients; dosage form; route of administration; 
and strength; and the FDA assigned therapeutically equivalent codes starting with 
the letter "A “. (Thomson Micromedex, 27th Ed.)  
Bioequivalent: The standard that a non-innovator multi-source drug has to match 
with the original reference listed drug in acceptable parameters for bioavailability, 
which is the extent and the rate at which the body absorbs the drug. The generic 
version must deliver the same amount of active ingredients into a patient's 
bloodstream and in the same time as the single-source drug. (Thomson Micromedex, 
27th Ed.) 
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Appendix 1  
Supplementary Summary Figures of Medicaid Drug 
Utilization data set 1991 - 2009 
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 Medicaid Drug Claims*: Q1 1991 to Q2 2009
Expenditures ($) % of Expenditures ($) by Patent Status
Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims
All Drug Claims 355,855,935,514$  4,069,054,907$  359,924,990,420$  98.9% 1.1% 100.0%
Drug Claims with Unknown Product Info 8,921,029$              951,376$             9,872,405$              90.4% 9.6% 100.0%
Usuable Drug Claims 355,847,014,484$  4,068,103,531$  359,915,118,015$  98.9% 1.1% 100.0%
% of Drug Claims Used 99.997% 99.977% 99.997%
Drug Claims (Prescriptions, Rxs) % of Drug Claims (Prescriptions, Rxs)
Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims
All Drug Claims 7,021,655,279         272,850,310       7,294,505,589         96.3% 3.7% 100.0%
Drug Claims with Unknown Product Info 116,151                    92,261                  208,412                    55.7% 44.3% 100.0%
Usuable Drug Claims 7,021,539,129         272,758,049       7,294,297,177         96.3% 3.7% 100.0%
% of Drug Claims Used 99.998% 99.966% 99.997%
Units % of Units
Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims
All Drug Claims 471,839,151,449    58,487,642,444  530,326,793,893    89.0% 11.0% 100.0%
Drug Claims with Unknown Product Info 76,167,598              9,127,264            85,294,861              89.3% 10.7% 100.0%
Usuable Drug Claims 471,762,983,851    58,478,515,181  530,241,499,032    89.0% 11.0% 100.0%
% of Drug Claims Used 99.984% 99.984% 99.984%
Expenditures per Prescription ($/Rx) Ratio to Avg Expenditures per Prescription ($/Rx)
Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims
All Drug Claims 50.68$                      14.91$                  49.34$                      1.03                     0.30                     1.00                     
Drug Claims with Unknown Product Info 76.81$                      10.31$                  47.37$                      1.62                     0.22                     1.00                     
Usuable Drug Claims 50.68$                      14.91$                  49.34$                      1.03                     0.30                     1.00                     
Expenditures per Unit ($/Unit) Ratio to Avg Expenditures per Unit ($/Unit)
Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims
All Drug Claims 0.75$                         0.07$                    0.68$                         1.11                     0.10                     1.00                     
Drug Claims with Unknown Product Info 0.12$                         0.10$                    0.12$                         1.01                     0.90                     1.00                     
Usuable Drug Claims 0.75$                         0.07$                    0.68$                         1.11                     0.10                     1.00                     
Units per Prescription (Units/Rx) Ratio to Avg Units per Prescription (Units/Rx)
Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims Rx Claims OTC Claims All Drug Claims
All Drug Claims 67                              214                       73                              0.92                     2.95                     1.00                     
Drug Claims with Unknown Product Info 656                            99                          409                            1.60                     0.24                     1.00                     
Usuable Drug Claims 67                              214                       73                              0.92                     2.95                     1.00                     
* The Medicaid program administered by the various states covers drug claims most of which are for 
prescription drug products, however, some states also cover over-the-counter drug products.
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Appendix 2 
Drug Product Selection Provisions by States  
from 1990 to 2008 
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Appendix 3 
Drug Product Selection Provisions by States  
Per Year (1990 - 2008) 
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Appendix 4 
Generics Rates at the Substitutable Market national 
and by State 
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 SUBSTITUTION REGULATION
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE DESCRIPTION DEFINITION
Positive Formulary Formulary Based on Positive List A list of specific drugs or drug products that can be substituted.
Non-Formulary No Formulary Specified as Basis A state does not define a specific list drugs or drug products that can be substituted.
Others List Formulary Based on Other Lists A state have a list other than the Orange Book, or a positive or negative formulary.
Orange Book Formulary Based on Orange Book  A state reference the Orange Book as the basis for substitution.
How to Prevent Substitution by Check Box Substitution Prevented by Check Box A state where substitution may prevent when the prescriber checks a box on the 
prescription.
How to Prevent Substitution by Initials Substitution Prevented by Initials of Phrase A state where substitution may prevent when the prescriber writes the initial of a 
phrase such as DNS (Do Not Substitute), DAW (Dispense as Written), or BMN (Brand 
Medically Necessary) on the prescription.
How to Prevent Substitution by Writing Words Substitution Prevented by Written Phrase A state where substitution may prevented when the prescriber hand-writes a phrase 
such as "Do Not Substitute", "Dispense as Written", or "Brand Medically Necessary"  on 
the prescription.
Patient Cost Saving by Portion of the Cost Pass On Part of Cost Savings
A state where part of the cost savings from a generic must be passed on to the patient.
Patient Cost Saving by Full Saving Pass on Full Cost Savings A state where full cost savings from a generic must be passed on to the patient.
Prescriber Permission Based Only on Prescriber Permission A state where statute or regulation substitution can occur only if the prescriber gives 
permission to do so.
Permissive or Mandatory Generic Substitution is Mandatory A state where statute or regulation mandates generic substitution unless otherwise 
specified by the prescriber or the patient.
Patient Consent Patient Consent or Notification Required A state where patient consent or notification is required in order to substitute a 
generic.
SUBSTITUTION REGULATION (FINANCIAL INCENTIVES REGULATION)
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE DESCRIPTION DEFINITION
Basic Discount AWP AWP % Discount for Baseline Rx Is the percentage by which AWP is discounted to pay pharmacy for the drug ingredient 
cost. [For example, if the AWP discount is 15%, then the pharmacy will get paid 0.85 x 
AWP for the drug ingredient cost of a prescription.] The mean discount off of AWP is 
10.14% across State-Qtr-Year observations.
Discount Generic AWP AWP % Discount for Generic Rx Is the percentage by which AWP is discounted to pay pharmacy for the generic drug 
ingredient cost. [For example, if the AWP discount is 15%, then the pharmacy will get 
paid 0.85 x AWP for the drug ingredient cost of a generic prescription.] The mean 
discount off of AWP for generics is 11.99% across State-Qtr-Year observations.
AWP Channel Distribution A AWP % Discount by Channel of Dist. A State where the discount off of AWP differs across one or more channels of 
distribution (i.e., institutional (hospitals and long term care), chains, independents). 
About 93.8% of the State-Qtr-Year observations (3,309/3,528) have a discount off of 
AWP that differs for one or more channels of distribution. 
Dispensing Fee Base Rate Dispensing Fee for Basic Rx The amount of the dispensing fee paid to the pharmacy for each basic prescription 
dispensed. The average dispensing fee for a basic prescription was $4.32 across all 
State-Qtr-Year observations. 
Generic Dispensing Fee Dispensing Fee for Generic Rx The amount of the dispensing fee paid to the pharmacy for each generic prescription 
dispensed. The average dispensing fee for a generic prescription was $4.39 across all 
State-Qtr-Year observations. 
Institutional Dispensing Fee Dispensing Fee for Institutional Rx The amount of the dispensing fee paid to an institutional pharmacy for each 
prescription dispensed. The average dispensing fee for an institutional prescription 
was $4.55 across all State-Qtr-Year observations. State-Qtr-Years where the 
institutional dispensing fee was higher had:
Unit Dose Dispensing Fee Dispensing Fee for Unit Dose Rx The amount of the dispensing fee paid to the pharmacy for each unit dose prescription 
dispensed. The average dispensing fee for a unit dose prescription was $4.63 across all 
State-Qtr-Year observations. 
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